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Notes and Comments
A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer
Legislation: The Elimination of Negotiability
and the Cooling-Off Period*
Since the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code in 1952,
the American economy has been revolutionized by an enormous
growth in consumer credit.' Responding to this growth, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1968 pro-
posed a new code-the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC)-to
deal with problems of consumer law largely ignored by the UCC.2
Two widely acclaimed provisions of the UCCC are the proposed
restriction on the use of negotiable notes in consumer transactionsa
and the three-day cooling-off period for home solicitation sales." Un-
I The work on this project was conducted under a grant to Yale Law School from
the Ford Foundation. We are indebted to Harold E. Read, co-counsel for the Connecticut
Bankers' Association, Daniel Miller, Chairman of the Connecticut Home Improve-
ment Association, and Allison Dunham, Executive Director of the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, for their cooperation and advice throughout
the study.
1. In December 1952 outstanding consumer credit totaled $25.8 billion, and consumer
installment credit totaled $18.7 billion. 39 Fmn. REs. BULL. 1214 (1958). By November 1968
these two figures had jumped to $110.0 and $88.0 billion respectively. 55 FED. RES. BULL.
Af52 (1969). The amount of the outstanding consumer installment credit In repair and
nodernization loans (the subject of this study, see pp. 622-23 infra) was $1.4 billion In
December 1952, 89 FED. REs. BULL. 1214 (1953), and $3.9 billion in November, 1968. 55
FED. REs. BULL. A-52 (1969).
2. The Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCC] was not drafted to
cover the consumer law field comprehensively, but it does apply to consumer goods
in the absence of a special state statute. See UCC § 9-101, Comment: "Consumer install-
ment sales and consumer loans present special problems of a nature which makes special
regulation of them inappropriate in a general commercial codification. Many states now
regulate such loans and sales under small loan acts, retail installment selling acts and the
like. While this Comment applies generally to security interests In consumer goods, it Is
not designed to supersede such regulatory legislation."
8. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 2.403, 2.404, Alternatives A & B [hercinaltel
cited as UCCC]. See pp. 635-36 infra. The first official version of the UCC denied third
parties freedom from defenses in consumer sales. UCC § 9-206 (1952 version). See also
Note, Consumer Sales Financing: Placing the Risk for Defective Goods, 102 U. PA. L. REv.
782 (1954). This provision was later altered to allow third parties freedom from defenses
unless the enacting state had a different statute or decision for consumer goods. UCC
§ 9-206. This change was made under heavy pressure from the banking lobby. Kripke,
Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUIt. L. REv, 445,
470 (1968). In some states the proposed UCCC provisions have come under a similar at-
tack and this threatens the defeat of the new Code altogether.
4. UCCC § 2.502.
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certainty about the impact of the restriction on negotiability, in par-
ticular, is a major obstacle to the enactment of the new Code. While
the problems with which these provisions are concerned have been
much noted and analyzed,5 no empirical studies have been made of the
impact on financers, sellers, and consumers of existing statutes which
contain similar provisions.6 In order to provide data relevant to an eval-
uation of the probable impact of the UCCO, the Journal has made an
empirical study of the home improvement business in Connecticut and
the effects of certain provisions of the Connecticut Home Solicitation
Sales Act of 1967.Y The Act provides that (1) buyers have a right to can-
cel a home solicitation sale before midnight of the first business day
after signing the contract, and (2) the obligation to pay arising from a
home solicitation sale cannot be evidenced by a negotiable instrument.8
5. For discussions of negotiability in consumer transactions, see Gilmore, The Com-
mercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YAM L.J. 1057, 1093 (1954); Jones, Finance
Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 WAsIL U.L.Q. 177; Jordan
& Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 CoLu.t. L. REv. 387 (1968); Little-
field, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39
S. C.~t L. REv. 48 (1966); Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel": Limiting the
Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Onio ST.
L.J. 667 (1968); Vernon, Priorities, the Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer Financ-
ing, 4 B.C. Ian. & Cor. L. RFv. 531, 542 (1963); Comment, Negotiable Instruments Law
-"Close Connexity" and the Finance Company as a Holder in Due Course, 18 LA. L REv.
322 (1958); Note, Finance Companies and Banks as Holders in Due Course of Consumer
Installment Credit Paper, 55 Nw. U. L. Rev. 389 (1960).
For discussions of cooling-off periods, see Sher, The "Cooling.Off" Period in Door-to-
Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 717 (1968); Note, Consumer Protection: The Proposed
Cooling-Off Period, 2 VAL. L. Rev. 339 (1968).
6. There have been a few empirical studies of consumer credit in general and of
specific problems raised by consumer credit. E.g., BoAmm or GovxmNoms, FEnDs. REsmTv
Sysmrmn, CoNsumm INSrALL m.NT Caxnrr (1957); D. CAPLOVrrz, Tim PooR PAY MORE (1963);
Project, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High Risk Credit Buyers
in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.Al. REv. 879
(1967).
The few empirical studies have been overshadowed by the massive outpouring of gen.
eral studies of consumer problems. E.g., Consumer Credit, A Symposium, 8 B.C. Dmn. &
Coat. L. REv. 387 (1967); Symposium on Consumer Protection, 64 MICnL L. REv. 1197
(1966); Consumer Credit Symposium, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 301 (1960); Consumer Protection
Symposium, 29 OMo ST. L.J. 593 (1968).
7. CorN. Gs-4. STAT. § 42-134 to -143 (Supp. 1968) (PA. 749) [hereinafter dted by
section numbers: §§ 134-143]. The Act was passed July 6, 1967 and took effect October 1,
1967.
8. The Act makes two other changes in the law which were not included in our
study. First, Section 135 requires a notice on the contract informing the buyer of certain
statutory rights. These indude information about the cooling-off period, and about the
buyer's rights to a copy of the agreement, to pay off the full unpaid balance at any time,
and to bar the seller from unlawfully entering his premises. Second, Section 140 prohibits
what are commonly known as "referral sales": the seller offers the buyer a special deal
and in return the buyer gives the names of prospective purchasers to the zeller. For a
description of the fraud inherent in such a plan, see State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. ITM, Inc.,
52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Norman v. World Wide Distributors
Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963); Comment, Translating Sympathy for De-
ceived Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. mre. 395, 897-403
(1966).
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This Comment begins by discussing methodology and the sources
used in the study. A description of the essential characteristics of the
home improvement business in Connecticut is followed by an analysis
of the effect of the one-day cooling-off period provided for by the Con-
necticut Act. The bulk of the Comment is concerned with the impact
of the elimination of negotiability on financial institutions, dealers,
and consumers.
I. Methodology
In investigating the consequences of the Connecticut Act, question-
naires9 were sent in August 1968 to all Connecticut banks with total
assets of $25,000,000 or more,10 to all sales finance companies registered
with the Connecticut Bank Commissioner, and to 249 home solicitation
dealers. To prepare the questionnaires and then to supplement the
responses to them, interviews" were conducted through the spring and
fall of 1968 with a wide range of persons associated with the door-to-
door sales business-dealers, dealers' association representatives, dis-
tributors, bank and finance company officials, lawyers, and lobbyists.
Several facts should be considered as possibly limiting the validity
of the findings of this study: (1) the names of dealers solicited had to
be taken from only five sources; (2) completed quetionnaires were
returned by less than one-third of the dealers and sales finance com-
panies contacted; (3) the findings present the result of only one year's
experience since the passage of the Act; (4) the study focuses on the
home improvement business.
Source of dealer names. Attempts to find dealers through the phone
book indicated that the only reliable way to get names was from or-
ganizations which had direct experience with numbers of dealers.
Three volume banks, one large finance company, and one dealer trade
association supplied the names of more than 500 Connecticut dealers.
Questionnaires were sent to a little more than half of these.
9. The dealer questionnaire is fully set out in the Appendix infra.
10. Banks with assets of more than $25 million control over 90 per cent of the total
bank assets in Connecticut. See BANK COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF CONNEcTICUT, 1967
ANNUAL REPORT 64-65, 174-78 (1968). In interviews with dealers and bank officials, we
learned of no banks purchasing dealer paper to which we did not send a questionnaire.
These sources did not feel that smaller banks are significantly involved in the home
improvement field.
11. Responses to questionnaires and the interviews were conditioned on an agreement
that the identity of the respondents not be disclosed. Consequently, certain viewpoints
presented in this study can be attributed only generally (for example, "a Connecticut
banker").
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Using this limited number of sources left open the possibility that
the dealers studied would be unlike the average door-to-door dealer
in some material respect. Three considerations, however, indicate that
the sample is representative. First, the source institutions are large
and geographically comprehensive. Second, the detailed responses from
the banks revealed that not many more than 500 dealers in Connecti-
cut use institutional financing. Third, a computer table program
proved that the dealers identified by no single source varied consis-
tently in their responses from the other dealers in the sample.,
Questionnaire response percentages. The findings on Connecticut
banks are based on the responses of all twenty-six to which we sent
questionnaires. Complete findings were secured by phoning the thir-
teen banks who had not responded to either of our two mailings.
The statistics on door-to-door sellers are based on the responses of
51 dealers-or roughly one-fifth of the 249 to whom questionnaires
were sent.13 The dealer sample may not be perfectly representative;
any subgroup which voluntarily takes the time and has the candor to
respond to a questionnaire may differ from the average in some
material way.' 4 In this case, it may be expected that those who re-
sponded have more clerical assistance, have a greater sense of civic
responsibility, or are more concerned about the Act than the general
population of door-to-door dealers. To some extent the biases these
characteristics cause may cancel each other out-for example, the results
of this study indicate that those dealers with clerical help and those
injured by and thus most concerned about the Act are different classes
of dealers, with conflicting assessments of the worth of the Act?3
In addition, independent checks were made on the validity of the
dealer responses. The bank and finance company reports, for example,
covered much of the same ground. Likewise, interviews with distribu-
tors-the dealers' suppliers--yielded the views of another group with
12. The table program cross-references each answer (e.g., yes, no, no response) in the
dealer questionnaire with each other answer. The results of the cross-tabulation indicated
the patterns of dealer responses: for example, we could determine how many dealers
answered question three with a "yes," and then find out how these dealers answered
question 14.
13. We sent 269 questionnaires, but eleven were returned "address unknown" and
nine were duplicates sent mistakenly to dealers already contacted. Responsts were re-
ceived from 80. Twenty-one of these stated that they either made no door-to-door sales
or did not use institutional financing, seven returned incomplete questionnaires; one Nas
received too late to include in the study.
14. See generally G. SJOBERG & R. NETr, A MEmODOLOGY FOR SOCIAL RIEARCH 154
(1968). For a critique of the Kinsey Report on this basis, see IV. CocainN, F. Mosrruxn
& J. TUKEY, STATISTICAL PROBLE.MS OF THE KINSEy REPORT 52 (1954).
15. See pp. 647-49 infra.
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inside knowledge of dealers and wide contacts among them. To verify
reports of serious injury, all dealers alleged to have gone out of busi-
ness were called.16 Furthermore, a computer table program isolated
subgroups of the sample to determine whether the trends found were
true of most dealers or whether they were true only of certain identi-
fiable subgroups and not of others.
Although returns were received from all banks, less than one-
quarter 17 of the sales finance companies to which questionnaires were
sent responded. However, this low rate of return is neither surprising
nor a serious flaw in the study because finance companies play a very
small role in financing door-to-door home improvement transactions.' 8
Timing of the study. The Act was passed by the Connecticut legis-
lature on July 6, 1967. Financers in the next months debated and
decided what policy they would follow when the Act became effective
on October 1. Some banks and finance companies which withdrew from
dealer financing in the fall of 1967 reevaluated their decisions as expe-
rience under the Act accumulated in the next months and readjusted
in the spring of 1968 by adopting more liberal financing standards.
Whether this trend will continue subsequent to the findings of this
study, which reflect the state of business as of the end of September
1968, is difficult to estimate. So far, however, the readjustments since
the initial banking changes in July 1967 seem to have been confined to
smaller volume banks and finance companies and have not been so
marked as to appreciably affect the general availability of credit or the
general validity of the findings of this study.
The Home Improvement Business. The study is limited to sale of
home improvement products and services for three reasons. First, the
Connecticut Act, like certain other state acts, 9 seems to have been
16. See Appendix, Dealer Questionnaire, question 20. Phone responses from dealers
alleged to have gone out of business were of course not included among the 51 dealers
in our statistical sample.
17. Twenty of Connecticut's 88 sales finance companies responded to our request.
18. In this study, for example, not one responding dealer indicated that he financcd
exclusively with sales finance companies. Similarly, of the 20 sales finance companies
which responded to our questionnaire, only three presently handle dealer paper and
two of the three are only slightly involved with four and two dealers respectWely.
Our findings of relatively slight finance company involverpent in Connccticut is con-
firmed at the national level by federal reserve statistics: At the end of November 1008
commercial banks held $2,723,000,000 in repair and modernization loans, while saes
finance companies held $74,000,000, about 2.6 per cent of the bank total. 5 FMa. REs.
BULL. A-53 (1969).
19. See, e.g., the earliest cooling-off period statutes, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 73, § 500.202(c)(4) (Supp. 1969), MicH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 44f..1202 (1967), which are limitcd ill scope
to "home improvement installment contracts."
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aimed primarily at this business.20 Second, this category appears to
constitute the great majority of door-to-door sales financed by banks
in Connecdcut.21 Third, home improvements represent a discrete field
of business suitable for empirical study.
II. A Description of the Home Improvement Business and
its Financing
One of the primary aims of this study was to determine business and
financing practices in the home improvement business in Connecti-
cut.22 The following description is based on reports from dealers and
their financing agencies.
Home improvement is a loose term which encompasses many differ-
ent types of businesses.2 It includes both (a) general maintenance and
repair work-such as replacement of broken windows, plumbing and
heating, roofing and siding, painting and plastering,2 4 and (b) major
alterations or additions-such as swimming pools, air conditioning,
fencing, new kitchens, and paved driveways.205 Although some home
improvement dealers work as general contractors and will accept any
work relating to the home, most specialize in one of the above cate-
gories.
The Connecticut home improvement business has not attracted new
dealers in recent years,20 and many existing firms have not grown in
size.27 While some sellers are large enterprises with many employees,
20. Interviews with home improvement dealer and financing agency lobbyist, spring
1968.
21. Interviews with Connecticut bank officials, spring and fall 1968.
22. For descriptions and analyses of home solicitation sales, see Sher, supra note 4.
and a project study now underway by the U.C.LA. Law Review. For a description of
the home improvement business, see Comment, Legislative Solution to a Judicial
Dilemma: The Pennsylvania Home Improvement Finance Act, 10 ViL. L RE'. 309
(1965). For descriptions of consumer installment sales financing, see B. CunAN, Tnnmes
iN Cosusmm Camrr LEIL.ATION 5-14 (1965); Jones, supra note 5, at 177-180.
25. The categories used here were derived from the dealers' responses to the question:
"What is your main line of business?"
24. This category included 25 of 40 respondents. This type of work will be referred
to in this article as "general repair" work.
25. This category included 15 of 40 respondents. This type of work will be referred to
as "major alterations or additions."
26. No responses came from dealers who had entered the business within the past
year; only five had been in the business less than five years; 19 had been in the business
six to 15 years; and 26 had been operating more than 15 years. This might indicate a
high failure rate among new dealers.
27. Eleven of the dealers who have been operating over 15 years arc one or two-man
concerns. See note 123 infra.
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many are either one-man concerns or very small firms with just a few
salesmen. 28
Home improvement dealers operate in one or more of the following
ways: the dealer solicits door-to-door and completes the entire transac-
tion in the buyer's home; the dealer calls or receives calls from poten-
tial customers and then visits the home where the contract is signed;
the dealer visits the home prior to the buyer's agreement to the con-
tract, but the contract is completed at the seller's office; the entire
transaction is completed at the seller's place of business.20 The first
method and probably the second are within the definition of home
solicitation in the Connecticut Act.' °
28. Fifteen of the dealers worked alone; five consisted of one head of business and
one full time canvasser; and 31 were larger.
29. We asked the following question about sales technique: "In what manner arc
your sales made? (a) You or your employee(s) go door-to-door, find people who are in-
terested in making purchases, and sign the contract at their homes. (b) You or your
employee(s) receive calls or visits from people interested in making purchases and you
then visit them in their homes and sign the contracts there. (c) You receive calls and
visit homes, but sign the contracts at your place of business. (d) People come to your
place of business and the sale is concluded there without any visit to the customer's
home."
For convenience, these categories will be referred to as (a) straight door-to-door, (b)
phone-home, (c) home-business-contract, (d) business-contract. The following table in-
dicates the breakdown of sales techniques of the 51 responding dealers:
SALES METODS EMPLOYED BY RESPONDING DEALERS
(BY NUMBER OF DEALERS)
Percentage of Respondent's Sales
In Which Method Employed
Sales Method 0 25% 50% 75% 100%
Straight Door-to-Door 31 8 2 5 5
Phone-Home 12 8 11 13 7
Home-Business-Contract 30 11 6 2 2
Business-Contract 35 10 4 1 1
It should be noted that there is an ambiguity as to which question covers the business
practice where the dealer solicits by phone and the contract is signed in the home. We
have assumed that this practice falls mainly under the phone-home method, despite
the emphasis in the straight door-to-door category on dealer initiative. This decision was
based on a spot check of dealers who had responded to the questionnaires.
30. A "home solicitation" sale is defined in Section 134 as a "sale of goods and services
in which the seller or his representative solicits the sale and the buyer's agreement or
offer to purchase is made at a home other than that of the person soliciting the
same ...." This section has not been interpreted by the Connecticut courts, and It is
likely that there will be a legal dispute over the definition of "solicit." Does it cover, for
example, the situation in which the buyer makes a preliminary phone call but the sale
is not completed until the seller visits the home? And does advertising constitute solicita
tion? Arguably the Act was not designed to cover anyone except the passive buyer who
takes no initiative at all until confronted by the seller, and a strict reading of "solicit"
would reach this result. Still, the Act's requirement that the contract be signed away
from the seller's home, or place of business, is a clearer standard which would avold
definitional haggling. Financing agencies have partially resolved the ambiguity by lump.
ing everything vaguely resembling a home solicitation sale into that category; and they
have gone even further by generally treating all of a particular dealer's sales as home
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After the contract is signed the seller often goes to a distributor and
purchases the goods or materials he needs to complete the contract.
The dealer may either pay the distributor on a job-by-job basis or
arrange for a line of credit. If the dealer needs workmen, he may be
able to hire some at the distributor's office;31 otherwise he completes
the work himself or with his own workmen.
Interlacing the process of solicitation, sale, obtaining materials, and
doing the work is the question of financing. In most situations the
buyer is either unwilling or unable to pay cash and some form of
credit must be arranged.32 The seller, however, may need cash immedi-
ately for personal reasons or in order to get the materials; or he may
be reluctant to carry the administrative burdens of long-term install-
ment contracts. 33 Furthermore, dealers of any size may make a greater
profit from immediate reinvestment of proceeds in their business than
they do from interest on outstanding debt. Since both parties desire
to make a contract, the financing difficulties are worked out by resort-
ing to a third party for assistance, and financial institutions play this
role.34
solicitation if any part of his business can be so labeled. Interviews with bank officials.
spring 1968. See also Littlefield, The Home Solicitation Sales Act of 1967, 42 CONN. B.J.
456, 437-39 (1968).
31. Interviews 'with dealers, spring 1968.
82. Thirty-one of 48 responding dealers noted that prior to the Act over 25 per cent
of their retail sales were installment credit sales, and the average response of the 48
dealers was close to 50 per cent. This figure for home solicitation sales is comparable
with the estimates of 25 per cent as the ratio of installment credit to retail sales for
consumer goods as a whole. Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California, 53 CALI. L REv.
1214, 1241 n.146 (1965).
83. For a discussion of the importance of installment credit for the consumer, see
C. PHELPS, FINANCING THE INsTALLMENT PURCHASES OF fIe AmIucAN FAMILY (1954); for
the importance to the dealer, see C. PHU.Ps, INsTALMEZir S.Lrs FxANctNG: ITS SEuvicrs
TO THE DEALER (1953).
84. The terms "financing agency," "financer," and "financial institution" are used in
this study to refer to all financial institutions which are somehow involved in financing
the home solicitation business. Banks handle most of the home improvement financing in
Connecticut. Thirty-six of the responding dealers work exclusively with banks and all
respondents dealt with at least one bank. See note 18 supra.
Commercial banks are the principal fmancers of home improvement sales; savings
banks in Connecticut are not allowed by law to purchase dealer paper, and their involve-
ment is therefore limited to direct loans to customers. See Letter from Connecticut Bank
Commissioner to the chief executive officers of each savings bank in Connecticut, July 3.
1967, on file in the Yale Law Library, interpreting CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 36-97a (Supp.
1968). Nationally, savings banks and savings and loan associations "typically have pre-
ferred longer term loans and investments and generally have not sought actively to
acquire a large share of repair and modernization loans." A"NmRicm BANKERS ASCoIA.
TION, THE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY 176-77 (1962).
Sales finance companies finance retail installment contracts, but they are not signifi.
cantly involved in home improvement financing. See note 18 supra. Financing with a sales
finance company tends to be more expensive than financing with a commercial bank,
since the cost of money is higher for finance companies than for banks. Sec generally
Wr. PLUM MER & R YOUNG, SALES FINANCE COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTIcES 61 (1940).
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The need for financial assistance has resulted in several different
financing arrangements involving the financer, the dealer, and the
buyer. The major distinction is between "indirect" and "direct" loans.
A direct loan involves only the financial institution and the buyer; the
buyer goes to the financing agency and takes out a loan in his own
name.35 An indirect loan, on the other hand, involves in the first
For a statistical study of sales finance companies and their operations, see 53 FrD. RM.
BULL. 534 (1967).
Small loan companies cannot purchase consumer paper from dealers, cannot make loans
of over $1,000, and in most instances cannot give secured loans. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 36-225 to -248 (Supp. 1969). For these reasons they are not significantly involved in the
home improvement business. For a statistical study of small loan companies, see 53 FE'D.
REs. BULL. 534 (1967).
There is some indication that the Act will cause distributors to make loans and enter
the finance business for their dealer-customers who have had trouble obtaining financing
from the traditional sources. Interview with dealer, fall 1968. At present, distributors
generally extend open account credit for 30, 60, or 90 days. Although financing dealer
sales would provide interest from the beginning of the credit extension, it seems likely
that the burdens to the distributor of carrying the long-term debt would in turn raise
costs for dealers and consumers.
Federal Housing Administration insurance of home improvement loans is available
to commercial lenders under Title I of the National Housing Act. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1703
(1969). To be eligible the principal of the loan must be less than $5,000 and the term
must be longer than six months and less than five years and 32 days. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1703(b)
(1969). Regulations promulgated under the Act limit financing charges to a maximum
of $5 per $100 original face amount per year for the first $2,500 and to $4 per $100 of
face amount per year in excess of $2,500. 24 C.F.R. § 201.4(a) (1968). Additional charges
such as recording fees and insurance premiums are narrowly restricted. 24 CF.R,, § 201.4
(b)-(d) (1968). The loans may be with or without security. 24 C.F.R. § 201.5(b) (1968).
Although reserve accounts are prohibited, a dealer may be required to indorse or guar.
antee the full amount of the loan. 24 C.F.R. § 201.4(c) (1968). The proceeds of tile loan
may "be used only to finance alterations, repairs, and improvements . . . which substan-
tially protect or improve the basic livability or utility of the property." 24 C.FR.
§ 201.6(b) (1968). See generally CURRAN, supra note 22, at 60-65, 75-76; CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 36-1780) (Supp. 1969) (savings and loan associations authorized to make home improve-
ment loans insured under Title I). Federal insurance is not at present an important
aspect of the home improvement loan business because the current yield is far below
market rates.
35. The definition and legal implications of a direct loan are complicated by Section
134 which states: "A sale which otherwise meets the definition of a home solicitation sale
except that it is a cash sale shall be deemed to be a home solicitation sale if the seller
* * .assists in obtaining a loan for the buyer to pay the purchase price." This provision
applies, for instance, when the dealer recommends that a buyer go to Bank "X" to obtain
a loan with which to pay the purchase price, and in return for the recommendation the
bank gives the dealer some special benefit. Prior to the Act, 16 dealers financed some
of their sales in this fashion.
The Act clearly subjects sales financed in this way to the notice provisions of Section
136 and to the cooling-off period provisions of Section 135, but there is some doubt as
to the effect of the elimination of negotiable notes in Section 138. Sonic banks believe
that direct loans given on the recommendation or with the assistance of the seller arc
now subject to the buyer's contract defenses. Interview with bank official, fall 1968. These
banks are therefore hesitant to make loans on dealer recommendations, although this
study showed a drop of only 3 dealers in the number that financed some sales in tills
fashion. Without legislation, case law in some jurisdictions already endangered the financ.
ing agency's holder in due course status in this situation. Cf., e.g., Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Orange County Mach. Works, 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950). But it does not
seem that the Act does this itself, since Section 138 states that "[a]ny transfer of a note
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instance only the buyer and the seller. The buyer signs a note along
with the sales contract promising to pay the price in installments. The
seller then sells the note to the financing agency, which collects the
installments from the buyer as they fall due. The financer has effec-
tively made a loan to the buyer, paying the proceeds directly to the
seller; the loan is then repaid in installments.
In making indirect loans, banks often do business only with a cer-
tain list of dealers,36 and they supply these dealers with a package of
forms-blank note forms, completion certificates, and traditional credit
applications--to be used in each credit sale. When the contract is
signed, the buyer normally signs a note providing for installment pay-
ments and completes a credit application. The dealer forwards the
credit application to the bank, which then decides whether to grant its
approval to the indirect loan. Usually approval is granted as a matter of
course to dealers who work regularly with the bank.3 7 When the work
is completed, the buyer executes a completion certificate.38 The dealer
then presents the completion certificate to the bank and negotiates the
or other evidence of indebtedness ... shall be deemed an assignment only ... " (empha-
sis added), and a direct loan, however obtained, does not require a transfer of a note or
debt.
It might be contended that all direct loans should be subject to consumer defenses
when the financer knows that the purpose of the loan is to purchase consumer goods.See generally Kripke, supra note 3, at 470-71 n.66. Such a rule would raise serious doubts
about a banks protection when its credit card is used to pay the purchase price of a
consumer good. See generally UCCC § 3.106(3); Bergsten, Credit Cards-A prelude to theCashless Society, 8 B.C. Ira. 9- Com. L. REv. 485, 509-17; Bank. Credit Cards and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1 VAL. L. Ray. 218, 242-43 (1967).
26. Before providing a dealer with indirect financing, most banks require that he
submit an application with information concerning his business and credit standing. See
p. 638 infra.
57. The credit application is helpful in case of default to inform the financer of the
nature and amount of the buyer's assets.38. Completion certificates are forms signed by the buyer which state that the work
under a specific contract has been completed to his satisfaction. The certificates are
theoretically signed after the work is completed. Banks require that they be signed beforefinancing is finally approved. AU lenders seeking FHA insurance, see note 34 supra, must
obtain completion certificates from their borrowers. See generally 24 CF.R. § 201.8(a)(2)
(1968).
It is widely believed that prior to the Act completion certificates were u-eless as aprotective device. Sellers would fraudulently sign the forms themselves or buyers would
sign them prior to the completion of work as a necessary condition to the seller's willing-
ness to help arrange financing. See generally MASs. AxnN. LAs ch. 255D. § 9A (1968)(certificates signed by buyer prior to completion are invalid). The dealer needed the
money before he could complete the work, the buyer wanted the work done, and the banks
-protected by holder in due course status-had no interest in further inquiry. Banks
have been more attentive since the Act, and in an attempt to cut down on misuse of the
certificates at least one bank now issues individual completion certificates only after eachindirect loan has been tentatively approved. Interview with bank official, spring 1968.
For the effect of completion certificates on holder in due course status, see International
Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1969) (finance company that sup-
plied certificate forms held apprised of actual conditions of sale and not a holder in due
course).
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note. Often the entire transaction is completed with one trip to the
bank, as the credit application, note, and completion certificate may
all be signed by the buyer at the same time.
III. Impact of the Connecticut Act: The Cooling-Off Period
In response to the high pressure and fraudulent sales techniques of
some home solicitation dealers and the typical passivity of home solici-
tation buyers,39 many states have enacted legislation providing a "cool-
ing-off" period. 40 This type of provision gives the buyer the right to
cancel a contract within a short period of time after the completion of
the sale. The purpose of these statutes is to provide a decompression
period during which the buyer can shop around and reconsider the
purchase out of the seller's presence.
The Connecticut Act allows the buyer to cancel before midnight of
the first business day after the contract is signed.41 One firm conclusion
of this study is that a cooling-off period of such short length benefits
consumers very little. Only seven dealers responded that customers
had used this provision, and only two of those indicated that it had
been used more than three times since the law went into effect. This
39. For a number of reasons home solicitation sales are a matter of special consumer
concern. First, the sales practices of door-to-door sellers tend to Involve high-pressure and
often fraudulent tactics. See Sher, supra note 4, at 721-25. Second, the consumer is more
likely to be taken by high-pressure tactics or fraud in his home than he is in the sales-
room. In the former case he is psychologically unprepared to evaluate objectively the
sales pitch whereas if he ventures out to the salesroom he has shown his "self-Inspired"
interest. Id. 725-26. Finally, as an explanation but not a justification for the separate
treatment of door-to-door sellers, the sellers affected by these laws are simply not as
politically powerful as the larger retail establishments.
40. In most states these statutes are limited to home solicitation sales. E.g., GA. CoDE
ANN. § 96-906 (Supp. 1968); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 1211/, § 262B (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969);
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 255D, § 14 (1968); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 63.14.0,10(2)(e) (Supp.
1968). See also MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 445.1202(c) (1968); PA. STAT. ANN. tt. 73,
§ 500-202(c)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1969) (both limited to home improvement sales). Biut see
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2454 (Supp. 1968) (all retail installment sales). The new federal
Truth-in-Lending Act, effective July 1, 1969, provides for a three-business-day "cooling-
off period" in consumer credit transactions in which a security Interest in the consumer s
residence is taken. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635 (Supp. 1969).
41. § 135. It should be noted that Section 135 provides the buyer with a one.day
cooling-off period "[i]n addition to any right otherwise to revoke an offer." In many
transactions the salesman is not able to make a firm offer to sell, and the seller's ac-
ceptance of the buyer's offer to purchase is conditioned on the approval by the salesman's
main office. In large home improvement contracts it seems particularly likely that the
seller would reserve to himself the opportunity to check the credit of the buyer before
final acceptance. In such a situation the buyer at common law would have the right to
cancel the contract any time prior to home-office acceptance. Without the "in addition"
provision quoted above, a cooling-off period statute might be construed as cutting off the
buyer's other cancellation rights by turning his offer to purchase into an irrevocable firm
offer after one day. See generally UCO 2-205. UCCC § 2.502 also contains a clause saving
the buyers' common law cancellation rights.
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conclusion is further corroborated by Legal Aid lawyers who say that
since the Act was passed they have had no clients seek advice within
the cooling-off period.42
This marginal benefit to the consumers may be balanced against an
almost total lack of harm to dealers and financing agencies. The financ-
ing agencies simply delay approval of credit until after the period has
lapsed. The dealers report little difficulty with the provision, and only
three dealers stated that they lost buyers to competitors who under-
sold them-the main fear of the businessmen prior to the Act.43 In fact,
dealers may use the right to cancel as part of the sales pitch to lower the
buyer's resistance to the sale.
Several factors explain the limited value of the one-day cooling-off
period. First, 40 dealers, about 90 per cent of those responding, stated
that before the Act they allowed customers to cancel sales already
concluded.44 If this is true, the statute simply brought the law into line
with existing business practices. Second, although notice of the buyer's
right to cancel must be printed on the contract, the seller does not have
to inform the buyer orally of his rights. 45 About half of the dealers
reported that they did so inform their buyers, but it is likely that many
buyers never know they have the right to cancel. 40 Third, and most
42. Interviews with staff attorneys, New Haven Legal Assistance Association. Inc..
New Haven, Conn., January 1969.
43. One dealer reported 18 cancellations stating that competitors used his "contract
to negotiate a lower price deal after we had done the groundwork advertising, sales, etc."
Another reported six cancellations worth $14,200 caused by "unethical competitors offering
purported better but phony terms and prices."
44. Thirty-seven dealers stated that they allowed cancellation as long as they had not
begun work on the job, and five reported that they allowed cancellation within one day
(there is undoubtedly an overlap between these two groups). These conclusions contrast
markedly with comments by legal aid lawyers that the retailers with whom they have
dealt never permit cancellation. Interview with lawyers at New Haven Legal Assistance
Association, Inc., New Haven, Conn., January 1969. Our findings are partially explained
by the time lag in certain cases between the consumer's "offer" to purchase and the
"acceptance" by the dealer's front office. See note 41 supra.
Nine of 56 responding dealers stated that they charged a penalty for cancellation. Of
course before the salesman receives home-office approval the dealer would have no legal
claim to a penalty, and this is still the case under the Act. See § 138(c): "If the buyer
avoids the sale on any ground independent of his right to cancel [under this Act], the
seller is not entitled to retain a cancellation fee." But, for cancellations authorized only
by the cooling-off provisions, the Act allows the dealer to "retain as a cancellation fee
five per cent of the cash price, fifteen dollars or the amount of the down payment, which-
ever is less." § 138(c). UCCO § 2.504 provides a cancellation fee of "5 per cent of the cash
price but not exceeding the amount of the cash down pa)ment."
45. For a fuller discussion of disclosure problems, see Sher, supra note 4, at 760.
46. One dealer capsulized his business ethics on this point as follows: "I aluays re-
member the story of the young ensign who was called to be a witness in a naval case
who asked his uncle, an admiral, how he should conduct himself on the witness stand.
The uncle said he should conduct himself like an officer of the US. Navy: square his
shoulders, answer questions with humility and respectfulness, but under no circumstances
get up there and blurt out the truth."
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important, the period is simply too short to have a substantial effect.47
Most buyers do not reconsider a contract until after the goods are re-
ceived or the services are performed. These events will usually not
occur within a day of the sale, especially since the sellers know that the
contract may be cancelled in that time.
The UCCC provides a three-day cooling-off period,48 but this mar-
ginal increase is not likely to have a major effect on consumers or
dealers. A substantially longer period, on the other hand, would
severely impede the sales and financing process. Home improvement
dealers would not make repairs until the period had run, since the
value of their services would not be easily recoverable if the buyer
rescinded the contract. And financing agencies would wait out the
period before extending credit, thereby cutting off the sellers' funds.
Furthermore, since most buyers are not motivated to cancel until they
see some evidence of the work or feel the impact of the financing plan,
even a longer period might not successfully protect consumers.
IV. Impact of the Connecticut Act: The Elimination of Negotiability
When a financing agency makes an indirect loan, it normally be-
comes a holder in due course of the negotiable instrument. 0 As a
result, its claims against the maker of the instrument usually cannot
be defeated by defenses arising from the contract signed in conjunc-
tion with the negotiable note8 0 The buyer's only remedies are either
47. Legal aid lawyers interviewed stated that prior to the Act clients almost never
complained within a day of the sale. Interviews with staff lawyers, New Haven Legal
Assistance Association, Inc., New Haven, Conn., January 1969. For a general discussion
of the length of a cooling-off period, see Sher, supra note 4, at 756-60.
48. UCCC § 2.502. See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1211, § 262B (SmithHurd Supp, 1968).
49. The requirements of a negotiable instrument are set out in UCC § 8 104(1), A
financing agency becomes a "holder" by purchasing a negotiable note. UCC §§ 1-201(20),
3-102(l)(e). A holder is a "holder in due course" if he takes for 'altle, In good faith, and
without notice that the instrument is overdue, has been dishonored, or is subject to any
claim or defense. UCC § 3-302. For a limited discussion of the cage law interpretation
of these provisions, see notes 62 & 63 infra.
50. Except for certain defenses enumerated in UCC § 3-305, a holder in due course
takes the instrument free of all claims to it on the part of any person and all defenses
of any party with whom the holder has not dealt. The exceptions seldom arise; they In.
clude infancy, duress, and "real" or "essential" fraud. The test in determining this latter
category is "excusable ignorance of the contents of the writing signed." UCO A 1-805,
Comment 7.
It should be noted that legal positions similar to those created by negotiability are
created by certain "waiver-of-defenses" clauses. These clauses customarily provide that
the
Buyer hereby acknowledges notice that the contract may be assigned and that as,
signees will rely upon the agreements contained in this paragraph, and agree that
the liability of the Buyer to any assignee shall be Immediate and absolute and not
affected by any default whatsoever of the Seller signing this contract, and in order
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to join the breaching seller in a suit brought by the financial institu-
tion or to bring a separate action against the seller. Both of these
possibilities are unavailable if the seller is insolvent or has disappeared.
The holder in due course status has long been justified on the
grounds that it is needed for the free movement of commercial paper.r"
Financing agencies do not want to take claims which are subject to
contract defenses, and this reluctance damages the businessmen who
rely upon financing agencies to purchase their customers' notes. Many
businessmen need ready cash, and it is only by selling these notes to
to induce assignees to purchase this contract, the Buyer further agrees not to set up
any claim against such seller as a defense, counterclaim or offsLet to any action by
any assignee for the unpaid balance of the purchase price or for possession of the
property.
Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 106, 232 A.2d 405, 408 (1967). The validity of these clauses
has often been judicially upheld. See Anglo-California Trust Co. v. Hall, 61 Utah 223.
211 P. 991 (1922). But see American Nat'l Bank v. A.G. Sommerville. Inc., 191 Cal. 364,
216 P. 376 (1923). For a compilation of cases on both sides of the issue, see Gilmore,
supra note 5, at 1096-97 n.118; Jordan & Warren, supra note 5, at 434 nn.132 & 134.
UCC § 9-206 approves a waiver-of-defenses clause unless the enacting state has a con-
flicting statute or court decision for consumer goods. The Connecticut Act does not Cx-
plicitly prohibit waiver-of-defenses clauses, but Section 136(a) provides that a transferee
"shall be subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer . . ." (emphasis added). This
provision, interpreted in the light of the legislative intent to eliminate negotiability in
home solicitation sales, should invalidate waiver-of-defenses clauses or other provisions
having the same effect. See generally Littlefield, The Home Solicitation Sales Act of 1967,
42 CONN. B.J. 436 (1968). If waiver-of-defenses clauses are given full effect by te courts,
their use will become more common. Financers would be full) protected from buyer
defenses and the Act's prohibition of negotiable notes would be emasculated.
The use of completion certificates poses a related problem. Financers will not cus-
tomarily agree to purchase a consumer's note from a dealer until the) receive a signed
completion certificate. Note 38 supra. When a financer relies on a form signed by the
buyer warranting that the work has been completed satisfactorily, it is possible that he
takes the note free of any defenses based on lack of consideration or unsatisfactory per-
formance. In fact, the completion certificates of major banks, which must be signed by
both the dealer and the buyer, require the dealer to promise that "the makers of the
Note have not asserted and will not assert any defense to the collection of the Note in
accordance with its tenor."
The legal effect of such a certificate is unclear. If it is treated as a waiver of defemes,
then perhaps it will be invalidated on the reasoning presented above. But a recent New
York court has held that a completion certificate estops the maker front asserting defenses
against financers within 10 days of the notice of assignment even where a statute ex-
plicitly renders null a waiver-of-defenses clause within that period. Chase Manhattan
Bank v. McLeish, 286 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. CL, App. Term, 1968). There is no rational
justification for this decision. So interpreted, completion certificates, like waiver-of-
defenses clauses, are inconsistent with a clear statutory policy to preserve consumer
defenses. Moreover, even without considering statutory policy, a court should find for
the consumer in construing a completion certificate such as the one quoted above. There,
the dealer explicitly promises that the buyer will not raise any defenses against the
financer; in direct juxtaposition, the consumer makes no such agreement: expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. However, if courts are not willing to preserve consumer defenses,
then the legislature should pass a law denying the validity for all purposes of a comple-
tion certificate signed before the work is satisfactorily completed. See generally M ss.
ANN. LAws ch. 255D, § 9 (1968).
51. See, e.g., J. CHrT, A TR.ATISE ON THE LAW or BtLus Or ExeCMcNE 9-10 (1803).
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financial institutions that they can obtain it.52 While this argument is
generally accepted for commercial transactions,5 3 the use of negotiable
notes in consumer sales has recently come under attack on two
grounds. 4 First, financing agencies are better able to bear the costs of
default or fraud by the seller than are individual consumers." Second,
by conditioning a financial institution's liability on the seller's ade-
quate performance, the elimination of negotiability forces financial
institutions to screen more fully dealers applying for financing and
to refuse to finance the sales of fraudulent dealers.60
A. Alternative Restrictions on Holder in Due Course Status
The development of case law and the enactment of special statutes
have limited both the natural effects and the misuses of negotiability.
To become a holder in due course under the UCC, the holder of a
negotiable note must take in good faith and without actual knowledge
of a claim or defense.57 Recently courts have interpreted these require-
ments to furnish limited protection to the consumer. 8 But the argu-
52. See pp. 625-26 supra.
53. Gilmore, supra note 5, at 1101-02. But see Kripke, supra note 3, at 472.73. Profes.
sor Kripke seems to argue that the holder in due course status may not be needed in
any context. He states that commercial parties do not need a freedom from defenses rule
-indeed, in the financing of accounts receivables they do not use negotiable notes-
because the commercial buyer will not tolerate the loss of defenses and financing agen-
cies can simply include the risks in the interest charged. In consumer sales, he continues.
negotiable notes are used because the contracts are adhesion contracts. These contracts
should not be tolerated and financing agencies can easily incorporate the risk in the
interest rate as they do in commercial situations.
54. See generally cases cited notes 59 & 63 infra; statutes cited note 64 infra; articles
cited note 5 supra.
55. This problem can be viewed as a question of how to divide a loss between two
innocent parties, the buyer or the financer, when the seller goes bankrupt or leaves the
jurisdiction. For commercial transactions, the loss should arguably be put on the com-
mercial buyer since this enhances the flow of commercial paper and both parties are
economically capable of withstanding the loss. For consumer transactions, the parties
are neither economically equal nor equally capable of withstanding the loss, and this
factor may outweigh the policy behind negotiability. See generally Jordan & Warren,
supra note 5, at 436; TAN 133 infra.
56. This policy will be referred to throughout this article as the "screening function"
of the elimination of negotiability.
57. See note 49 supra; UCC § 3-104 (setting out the requisites of negotiability); UCC
§§ 3-302 to 3-305 (defining a holder in due course). The concepts of good faith and notice
overlap considerably. For instance, a holder of a note who has knowledge of an under.
lying contract defect can hardly be said to have met the good faith standard of honesty
in fact.
58. For a somewhat dated but comprehensive state by state summary of the relevant
cases, see Jones, supra note 5, at 197. The trend in the case law is in favor of the con-
sumer, and most of the state appellate court decisions in recent years have preserved de-
fenses by one means or another. See Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967), and
cases cited therein. But the process is slow and many states, especially in lower courts,
still hold to the traditional rules. See Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir.
62, 238 A.2d 446 (1967); Burchett v. Allied Concord Fin. Corp., 74 N.M. 575, 396 P.2d 186
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ment that holder in due course status puts the risk on the wrong party
leads, if followed, to the elimination of negotiability in the consumer
context; and a court would have to ignore or overrule the Code to
reach such a result.59 In addition, the cases do not provide a satisfactory
means of requiring financers to screen the dealers with whom they do
business. While actual knowledge of a claim or defense will deprive a
financing agency of holder in due course status,co such institutions have
(1964). More importantly, the financer's threat to invoke its holder in due course status
in court undoubtedly scares off many aggrieved consumers. Moreover, these cases are
frequently handled in summary fashion by judges and lawyers unfamiliar with recent
developments in the case law.
59. The only case which even vaguely resembles a move towards prohibiting holder
in due course status altogether for holders of consumer paper is Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J.
101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967). See also Comment, Unico v. Owen: Consumer Finance Com.
panies as Holders in Due Course under the UCC, 54 VA. L. Rtv. 279 (1969). The buyer
had signed both a negotiable note and a contract which contained a waiver-of-defenses
clause; both were sold to Unico, a finance company. The New Jersey Supreme Court
began its opinion with a policy discussion of the consumer credit industry, denied holder
in due course status to Unico because of its close connection to Universal, the seller, and
declared the waiver of defenses void as contrary to public policy.
The Court gave three reasons for holding invalid the waiver-of-defenses clause: (1) the
clause is contrary to the policy of the Negotiable Instrument Law (Unico was decided
prior to the enactment of the UCC in New Jersey; it is interesting to note that on the
whole UCC's Article 3 is more difficult for consumers than was tie NIL; see Comment,
Unico v. Owen, supra, at 286), because it attempts to give the contract negotiability with.
out the prerequisites for such status; (2) the clause is contrary to the spirit of N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:25-1 (1952), which states that assignees are subject to the defenses which the
buyer had against the assignor at the time of notice of the assignment of the contract; and
(3) the policy of the state is "to protect conditional vendees against imposition by condi-
tional vendors and installment sellers." Unico v. Owen, supra at 124, 232 A.2d at 418. How-
ever, the first reason does not support the court's derision, and the latter two do not distin.
guish between a holder of a contract with a waiver-of-defenses clause from a holder in
due course.
Only if the prerequisites of negotiability particularly protect the consumer-and there
is no evidence that they do-does the first argument make any sense as the basis of a
decision limited to consumer goods. Morever, the very problems raised by negotiable
instruments in the consumer context indicate that the form of a negotiable note is not
sufficient and probably not even helpful if one's interest is in protecting consumers.
The court's second argument, that the spirit of the assignment statute is violated, col.
lapses when these provisions are compared with UCC § 9-206, which specifically permits a
waiver-of-defenses clause. It is true, as the court points out, that Section 9.206 penits
a different rule for the sale of consumer goods, but it would equally support a prohibi-
tion on negotiability in the consumer context since Section 9-206(1) gives negotiability
as an example of the type of agreement which can have separate consumer treatment: "A
buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a Security
agreement makes such an agreement." Thus, negotiability would also be subject to the
use of Section 9-206 to create an exception for consumer goods.
The real basis for the court's holding seems to be the third reason-that New Jersey
has a policy of protecting conditional vendees-but this reason is even more valid in
attacking negotiable instruments than a simple waiver-of-defense clause. The court is
concerned that the buyer-read consumer-not unwittingly lose his defenses under the
contract; but this happens even more completely with a negotiable note. The waiver-of-
defenses clause is at least printed on the contract for the buyer to read, whereas most
consumers probably have no idea that they are effectively signing away their rights when
they sign a negotiable instrument.
60. Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 Conn. Cir. 620, 623, 238 A.2d 446, 448 (1967)
("[flailure of plaintiff to inquire as to proper performance by (the dealer] of its under-
lying contract with defendants does not show a lack of good faith or alter its status tinder
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no duty to acquire this knowledge by investigation."1
In a few cases courts have gone beyond the actual knowledge test in
determining whether a financing agency holds a note in due course.
Some of these cases concern the dealer's relationship with the financer-
the close connection test 02-while others examine the suspicious cir-
cumstances surrounding a particular transaction and apply what
amounts to an objective notice test. 3 These situations accomplish the
[UCC § 3-302]"). See First Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 7 D. & C.2d 661, 666 (Bucks Co. 1956)
("... if a holder of an instrument were required to investigate in each Instance whether
the contract had been completed satisfactorily before accepting it, the burden placed on
the free flow of negotiable paper would be insurmountable").
61. Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. 343 (1857); Littlefield, supra note 5, at 50-53.
62. This test has been applied both when the financer is closely involved in the Indi.
vidual transaction and when the financial institution has had close ties with a seller over
a period of time. It may be justified on various grounds: if close connection is established
the financer may be deemed to have notice of the entire transaction; the seller may be
held to be the agent of the financial institution; or the financer may be considered a
"party" to the transaction which has "dealt" with the buyer. But since actual notice,
legal agency, or direct dealing are often not clearly shown, it is quite likely that con-
sumer protection is the controlling factor in many of the cases. See Jones, supra note 5;
,Littlefield, supra note 5; and cases cited in both.
63. Despite the general rule that the financer has no duty to investigate further than
the face of the note, it seems clear that at some point and with certain facts any court
would require investigation before finding good faith or lack of notice of a claim or
defense. See generally UCC § 1-201(25)(c): "A person has notice of a fact when . . . (c)
from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason
to know that it exists." (Emphasis added.) The buyer-defendant must show that the
financer deliberately closed his eyes to facts which he was afraid would indicate a claim
or defense on the note. By refusing to investigate in such a case, the holder is said to be
not in good faith. See First Nat'l Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337, 340, 17 A.2d 877, 379
(1941) (failure to make inquiry must be under circumstances which "indicate a deliberate
desire . . . to evade knowledge because of a belief or fear that investigation would
disclose a vice in the transaction"; such circumstances not shown in this case). Or
alternatively, the law "presumes that he knows whatever proper inquiry would disclose."
City of New York v. Nic Homes, Inc., 44 Misc. 2d 440, 443, 253 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930 (Civ.
Ct. 1964).
The question, then, is to ascertain what facts must be present before a court will
impose a duty to investigate on a financial institution. These facts may relate to the
seller's general business, to the particular note in question, or to the underlyinq sales
transaction, and together they constitute what might be called the "suspicious circum-
stances" test of a holder in due course.
In the general business category, a court might consider the financer's knowledge of
the dealer's generally poor business reputation. Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams, 246
Md. 575, 585, 229 A.2d 712, 716-17 (1967); Westfield Investment Co. v. Fellers, 74 N.J.
Super. 575, 590-91, 181 A.2d 809, 818 (Law Div. 1962). Contra, Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 125, 196 N.E.2d 847, 852 (1964) (evidence of knowledge of
bad reputation held correctly excluded by trial court). And it might consider the finan.
cer's knowledge of the seller's fraudulent methods of business. See Lefkowitz v. ITM,
Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 51-52, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 319 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Norman v. World Wide
Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 58-59, 195 A.2d 115, 118 (1963).
With respect to the financer's knowledge of certain circumstances relating to a particu-
lar note, courts might consider the following as suspicious circumstances: the note was
on a form provided by another financing agency, see Westfield Investment Co. v. Fellers,
supra, at 589-90, 181 A.2d at 817 (dictum); the note was purchased "without recourse"
when the seller professed difficulty selling the note, see Stevenson v. O'Neal, 71 Il1. 314
(1874) (dictum); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 487 (1932); or the note was purchased at a substantial
discount, see Financial Credit Co. v. Williams, supra, at 584, 229 A.2d at 716, Annot., 91
A.L.R. 1139 (1934).
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limited goal of shifting the burden of risk in certain cases involving
fraud or insolvency and thereby imposing a slight screening require-
ment on financing agencies; but they fall far short of providing ade-
quate protection to consumers.
In contrast to the case law, special statutes restricting negotiability
in the consumer context can and do shift much of the risk of the
seller's fraud or default from the consumer to the financing agency.
At one extreme are statutes which eliminate the holder in due course
status altogether for holders of consumer paper:04 a holder of an other-
wise negotiable note becomes an assignee, subject to the obligor-buyer's
defenses against the seller-assignor. 5
A less complete elimination of negotiability is presented in the Con-
necticut Act and proposed in Section 2.403 and Alternative A of Sec-
tion 2.404 of the UCCO. Section 2.403 states that in a consumer sale
a seller may not take a negotiable instrument from the buyer. But the
section provides further that "a holder is not in good faith if he takes
a negotiable instrument with notice that it is issued in violation of
this section." The necessary implication is that if a note is renegotiated
under circumstances which do not give the second or subsequent
financing agency notice that the original sale was to a consumer, the
later holder qualifies as a holder in due course.0 Except for this loop-
In the final category-the seller's knowledge of an installment contract or other secu-
rity agreement purchased simultaneously and in conjunction with the note--a court
might consider as suspicious the conditional liability of the buyer. See generally Inter-
national Fin. Corp. v. Rieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1963). But see UCC
§ 3-304(4)-(6). And a court might consider relevant any unconscionable clauses or op-
pressive terms in the contract. See UCO § 3-304(1).
In addition to the above factors, this study suggests that certain business practices are
sufficiently established that a court should consider any deviation from them as a sus-
picious circumstance. A court would not have to adopt a good faith standard of com-
mercial reasonableness to do this, although some courts seem to have already adopted
such a standard. See Vestfield Investment Co. v. Fellers, supra at 584, 181 A.2d at 814;
City of New York v. Nie Homes, 44 Misc. 2d at 443, 253 N.Y.S.d at 930. Rather, it would
simply impose a duty to investigate if the evidence of commercial deviation indicated a
desire to purposefully overlook a defect. For instance, since financers usually establish
working relationships with certain dealers, pp. 627-28 supra, the burden of inquiry should
be imposed on a financer who buys notes from a seller with whom he has not previously
done business. Similarly, since the financing agencies claim that they already investigate
the dealer's general business and reputation and even each individual transaction, a
financing agency which did not meet this standard of investigation should be held to
have had notice of any defense which might arise. See p. 638 infra.
64. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 147 (1968); MAss. GE.N. Liws ANN. ch. 255, § 12c
(1968); ITT. STAT. AN. tit. 9, § 2455 (Supp. 1968); Rv. CODE WAsn. ANN. tit. 63. § 14.020
(Supp. 1968).
65. See 4 A. CoRmiN, CovrRAcrs § 892 (1963).
66. The Connecticut Act has a similar provision and therefore comes within this
second category of statutes. Section 138(d) states: "A promissory note payable to order or
bearer and otherwise negotiable in form issucd in violation of this section may be en-
forced as a negotiable instrument by a holder in due course according to its terms."
Three factors reduce the significance of this provision: (1) The initial purchaser of a
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hole, any third party acquiring a claim against a consumer can do so
only as an assignee. Section 2.404 Alternative A embodies the tradi-
tional contract rule that assignees are subject to all defenses which the
buyer has against the seller.
A third approach eliminates negotiable notes in consumer sales on
the one hand, but provides for a limited loss of defenses against as-
signees on the other.67 Two of the most important examples of this
approach are Alternative B of Section 2.404 of the UCCC and, with
slight variations, the New York Retail Installment Sales Act."8 The
UCCC provision, for example, provides that when the buyer agrees
not to assert claims against assignees-a practice which presumably
will become standard where waiver of defenses clauses are legal but
negotiable instruments are not-the buyer's rights and defenses are
cut off if the holder gives the buyer notice of the assignment and the
buyer does not assert certain claims within the time period provided
in the statute. 9
Whether such statutes can induce adequate screening 0 and whether
consumer note from a dealer would almost never qualify as a holder in due course, and
there is at present very little renegotiation of consumer paper. See Jordan & Warren,
supra note 5, at 436. (2) Even if there were a secondary market for negotiable notes, the
financers would be on notice of the Act's limitation. As stated in the Official Comment
to UCCC § 2.403: "Since the prohibition against negotiable notes in consumer financing
will be well known in the financial community after enactment of this Act, professional
financers buying consumer paper will normally not qualify as holders in due course with
respect to notes taken by dealers in violation of this section and negotiated to them."
(3) Banks in Connecticut supply blank notes to dealers, pp. 627-28 supra, which are already
stamped with the required statutory notice that they are not negotiable. In interviews
with several dealers and bank officials, we heard of only one bank-dealer relationship in
which the bank provided both negotiable and non-negotiable notes. Therefore, at least
with respect to bank financing of home solicitation sales, it is almost impossible for a
negotiable consumer note to fall into the hands of a financing agency.
67. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4312 (Supp. 1966) (15 days); ILL. REV. STAT. ch, 121 ,
§ 262D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968) (5 days); TEXAS SEssioN LAws ch. 274, tit. 79, art. 6.07
(Vernon 1967) (30 days).
68. N.Y. Pam. PROP. LAw § 403(3) (McKinney 1962) (all consumer goods). See also
N.Y. PEgs. PRop. LAW § 302(9) (McKinney 1962) (motor vehicles).
69. The New York statute has a 10 day cut-off period; UCCC § 2.404 Alternative B
gives the consumer three months in which to raise a defense. For a discussion of the
problems with this kind of statute, see Jordan & Warren, supra note 5, at 435.
70. The Federal Housing Administration does require some screening of dealers in
loans which it insures. Before disbursing the proceeds of an Indirect loan, the FH-A.
insured financer must perform an investigation which he considers sufficient to find the
dealer "reliable, financially responsible and qualified to perform satisfactorily the work
to be financed and to extend proper services to the customer." 24 C.F.R. § 201.8(a)(I)
(1968). The records of the dealer's application, the supporting information, and the In-
sured's approval must then be maintained in the financer's office. Id. Where the financer
is unable to approve a dealer, to obtain FHA insurance he must conduct a very strict
investigation including verifying the borrower's credit position, personally witnessing the
signing of the completion certificate, and actually inspecting the work performed. 24
C.F.R. § 201.8(b) 1968). In addition, the FHA has a list of persons who, if known to be
in any way involved in a transaction, make the supporting loan ineligible for FHA In.
surance. Financers are given notice of dealers to whom they should not grant approval
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they create undesired side effects will be considered in the analysis of
the effects of the Connecticut Act.
B. Impact of the Connecticut Act: Financial Institutions"
By eliminating negotiability in home solicitation sales, the Connecti-
cut Act in the first impact shifted the balance between the consumer-
purchaser and the financing agency.72 Stripped of holder in due course
protection, financers"i were left to trigger the chain of private actions
and reactions which would determine the manner in which the door-
to-door business would henceforth be conducted.
74
The dearest consequence of the Act has been a marked reduction in
institutional financing of businesses engaged in door-to-door sales. The
reduced level of financing is dearly demonstrated by reports received
in the course of this study from banks and finance companies showing
the number of home solicitation dealers whom they financed before
and after the Act. In July 1967 nine of the responding financial in-
stitutions did recurring business with 15 or more dealers. These nine
and of ineligible persons by a booklet distributed yearly to them listing all such indi.
viduals. Telephone discussion with Connecticut Office of the FHA, March 5. 1969.
If FHA loans were highly desirable, see note 34 supra, these procedures might mo ale
refusals to finance fraudulent dealers both because of the screening and approval directly
required by the procedures, and because there would be a presumption with uninsured
loans that they had been granted to dealers who could not meet FHA standards. Courts
would then be in a strong position to deny holder in due course protection in the case
of uninsured loans on the ground that the financer had knowledge of the dealer's unrelia-
bility.
71. To protect the confidentiality of financers who gave us information, we are often
prevented in this section from citing to specific sources or othenvise presenting details
which might disclose their identity. The findings here are based on responses from all
major Connecticut banks. See p. 621 supra.
72. Connecticut law prior to the Act strictly protected third-part), financers from suit
by consumers even in egregious cases. See, e.g., Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski. 4
Conn. Cir. 620, 288 A.2d 446 (1967).
73. Fourteen of 26 banks and three of 20 finance companies responding to our ques-
tionnaires indicated that they had at the time of the Act financed home solicitation dealers.
74. Financers have been placed in an analogous position by Connor v. Great Western
Say. S- Loan Assoc., 73 Cal. Rptr. 569, 447 P.2d 609 (1968). Single-family haioe owners
in a tract development brought suit for negligence against Great Western, which had
both financed the tract developers and extended mortgages to the particular plaintiffs.
The California Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Tra)nor, overruled the traditional df.
fense of non-liability for lending institutions arguing that Great Western was intimately
involved in the transaction from start to finish--employing reasoning similar to that in
the "dose connection" cases denying holder in due course status. See note 62 supra. The
lender's new liability under this rule may cause it to cease close relations with developers
altogether;, but this is an undesirable result if the court's intention is to protect home
buyers by forcing lenders to screen developers' work quality. Increased screening and
greater reluctance to finance marginal developers are in fact more likely results since tEie
lenders will probably find close relations with a developer an unavoidable incident of
securing their loans; but the screening may lead to increased costs. Great Western argued
that the imposition of the duty "will increase housing costs, drive marginal dealers out
of business, and decrease total housing at a time of great need." Id. at 378. 447 P.2d at
618. The elimination of negotiability creates a similar process of increased liability, caus-
ing withdrawal or increased concern by financers, which lead in turn to increased costs.
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reported together a total of 800 dealer relationships.1 5 By August 1968
that total had been reduced by over 50 per cent to a sum of 388. The
extent of the decreases varied from institution to institution. Two
banks-one with about 200 dealers and the other with about 50-cut
off no dealers. One finance company with 18 dealers cut off only one.
On the other hand, one major bank with approximately 185 dealers
got out of the business altogether. No financing agency reported a net
gain of dealers in this period.
This study's figures on the volume of commercial paper handled by
banks and finance companies are not comprehensive, since not all in-
stitutions provided this information. Neither are they as perfect an
indication of the decline in financing as is the decrease in dealer rela-
tionships, because it was difficult for the institutions to give data for
comparable time periods before and after the Act. What information
was received, however, points in the direction indicated by the dealer-
relationship decrease. Only one of the six banks and finance companies
giving this information reported a net increase in volume70-and that
increase, experienced by a bank, is relatively small compared with the
decreases reported.7
To understand this decrease in financing, one must examine
financers' criteria for dealer selection and the terms of the financing
arrangements. All financers reported that they had had screening proce-
dures prior to the Act.78 All kept a record of the number of consumer
complaints about a dealer and the number of past defaults by a dealer's
customers. All interviewed the dealer and most checked with the Better
Business Bureau, Dun and Bradstreet ratings, and any other
local credit bureau available. Confidential financial statements were
often, though not invariably, required.
75. This figure is larger than the total number of dealers negotiating notes since manydealers had relationships with more than one bank or finance company. In our study,
only three of the 24 dealers responding reported using, prior to the Act, a single financing
agency. Twelve, 50 per cent of the respondents, used two or three, six used four or five,
and three dealers used six or more.
76. It is possible that there are significant increases in volume which this study did
not reveal since some major institutions did not provide this information, but other
factors-primarily the decline in dealer-relationshipt--make this possibility unlikely.77. It may be that not all of this decrease is attributable solely to the Act. During the1960's a few institutions had had unfavorable experience with dealer financing. One majorbank which had been among the first in the field and among the most heavily involved
withdrew in about 1960 after serious losses. One or two other banks reported that, due
to the riskiness of the business and the possibility of developing a bad public Imagethrough association with door-to-door salesmen, they were considering cutting back theirinvolvement in the area. For these banks, the Act was only the immediately precipitating
cause of restricting or discontinuing dealer financing. In July 1967, however, there were
also banks trying to break into this area of the credit market, and, for most, the Act
seems to have been the single motivation for restriction of dealer financing.
78. See also Note, 114 U. PA. L. REV., supra note 8, at 415,
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These investigations have generally been intensified since the Act
went into effect. Each of the above practices has become more regular.
In addition, institutions have begun to check with suppliers and other
banks and businesses which might be acquainted with the dealer.
Some banks and finance companies, moreover, now undertake inspec-
tion of the dealer's work--either on-site or, more frequently, through
a call to the customer. At least one financer now purchases notes on
sales only within its local area, where the job can be checked and in-
formation about the dealer is more readily available.
While intensified investigations afford financial institutions more
information about the dealers seeking to sell consumer paper to them,
the central question is what information is most important in de-
terming whether to accept or refuse a dealer. By conditioning a financ-
ing agency's absolute right to repayment on adequate performance by
the dealer in the underlying sales transaction, the Connecticut legisla-
ture hoped to induce in banks and finance companies concern for the
reliability of the dealers they were financing.7" Inspection of a dealer's
work and consideration of the number of complaints and defaults by a
dealer's customers indicate concern for the quality of his work.
Other screening procedures have less to do with work quality. Check-
ing Dun and Bradstreet ratings and requiring financial statements-
though not inconsistent with concern for quality-go more to a dealer's
solvency. That the length of relations between dealer and institution is
a factor mnay be explained partially by concern for quality but also by
the existence of personal ties. A most important factor cited by all
banks and finance companies is a dealer's volume of business with that
institution. Financial institutions are apparently reluctant to cut the
volume dealer off, not only because of the amount of credit business he
brings in, but also because of his other relations with the banks: he
typically has a mortgage, savings account, and checking account of
substantial size there.
The general decrease in financing, however, is not fully explained
by an enumeration of the factors which might lead an institution to
unconditionally refuse a dealer. At least as important in the decrease
are the new obligations which financing agencies now require of those
whom they are willing to finance. Fewer banks and finance companies
are in the business now, and those that have stayed have found that they
79. Of course financers can duck behind the protective shield of waivcr-o-dcfense
clauses or completion certificates if either of these is construed against the consumer.
See note 50 supra. But there is no evidence that financers epect this result and, in fact.
their new screening procedures indicate the contrary.
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can impose stricter financing conditions and still remain competitive.8 0
These new conditions have led many dealers to discontinue business
with certain institutions and discouraged others from seeking outside
financing altogether.
The most important new requirement imposed by banks to protect
themselves appears to be the repurchase agreement. Under this agree-
ment, the dealer promises to repurchase the customer's note from the
bank at the amount of the outstanding balance should the customer
for any reason refuse payment.8' Of eleven banks remaining in the
business after the Act, none reported having sought such agreements
prior to July 1967.82 Six of the eleven now require them.
The repurchase agreement restores to financing agencies much of the
security they enjoyed as holders in due course. There are, however,
practical limits to the worth of the agreements-they are only as strong
as the dealer's credit position, 3 and they can be enforced only if the
dealer can be found and brought into court. Thus, when a dealer's
solvency is in doubt or when he has few fixed assets to restrict his move-
ment, financers are unlikely to purchase his notes even under their
new terms.
It might be expected that another consequence of the increased
riskiness of financing would be higher financing charges. 84 Although
some dealers reported higher interest rates,8 not one bank or finance
company reported an increase in the rate on home improvement loans.
Nor, surprisingly, did these institutions report any increase in the fre-
quency or amount of discounting below the cash price of the product
80. The UCCC proposes to relax and simplify licensing requirements for lenders In
order to facilitate entry and thus foster competition in financing. See UCCC §§ 3.502-
3.503.
81. The repurchase agreement form of one Connecticut bank, for example, specifies
that dealers are contractually obligated on demand to buy back notes "if for any reason
whatsoever the maker sets up any claims, defenses, set-off, or counterclaim to ally note
or the collection thereof."
82. Repurchase agreements joined with non-negotiable notes secure for the financer
most of the advantages of fully indorsed notes. See UCC § 3-414(1). Thus financers seek-
ing this protection prior to the Act did not need repurchase agreements.
In fact, before the Act, dealers generally did not fully indorse their notes but trans.
ferred them to financing agencies "without recourse." This qualified indorsement placed
the risk of non-payment on the holder of the note-except in the case of buyer defenses
known to the seller at the time of the transfer. UCC § 3-417(3). Under the repurchase
agreement, however, the dealer is explicitly put on notice that he should expect the
financer to turn to him whenever it is unable to collect from the customer.
83. Thus, one bank that experimented prior to the Act with the functional equivalent
of the repurchase agreement-requiring the dealer to be co-maker of tile customer's note
-discontinued the practice because it soon found that its dealers had spread their secu-
rity so thinly that little real protection was afforded.
84. See note 134 infra.
85. Fifteen of 30 dealers responding so indicated. The reported increases may simply
reflect rising market interest rates for all loans.
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sold (the face amount of the paper)s No bank, in fact, reported that
either before or after the Act it discounted below the face amount at
all, s7 and although one finance company indicated that it presently
engages in this practice, it had done so before as well.88
There are less direct ways in which financing agencies can make
credit more expensive. One practice widely used by financial institu-
tions is the reserve account.8 9 Rather than pay a dealer outright the
total face amount of the note transferred to it, the institutions typically
retain a small percentage of the total-generally from 1 to 22 per
cent-in an account under the dealer's name. The dealer may at no
time draw from this account an amount which will reduce it below
the established base percentage of the aggregate unpaid balances on
notes purchased from the dealer. If the banks were to increase the per-
centage required to be maintained in the reserve account, the financing
would become more expensive since the dealer would have fewer liquid
resources. This study, however, found that reserve account require-
ments have not generally increased since the Act went into effectY0 Of
those reporting, only one institution-a relatively small-volume finance
company-reported a change in reserve account policy.
The study revealed one method by which financial institutions now
regularly take a greater return from home improvement transactions
than they did prior to the Act. A majority of banks and finance com-
panies previously gave dealers "incentive payments"-a percentage of
the interest rate or other payment supplementing the amount of the
86. The term "discounting" is employed narrowly in this article to designate only the
situation in which the lender takes as payment for financing an amount greater than the
interest rate stated on the face of the note purchased. Elsewhere "discounting" is some-
times used to refer to financer purchase of consumer paper generally.
87. It should be noted that banks set the minimum interest rate charged the con-
sumer by stating the fixed rates on the notes dealers use in sales. If the dealers them.
selves set the rate, banks would of course have to discount to secure the desired return.
See note 91 infra.
88. It is possible that financial institutions are reluctant to disclose that they engaged
in this practice and that our findings on this point are not strictly accurate. Reports from
dealers suggest that discounting is sometimes employed, see p. 643 inra, but it does
seem to be involved in only a small number of home solicitation sales.
89. Of seven institutions both responding to the question and remaining in the busi-
ness after the Act, three banks and two finance companies reported having reserve ac-
counts.
90. To the extent that financers used dealer reserve accounts before the Act, they did
not rely solely on their holder in due course protection. In cases where they took notes
with recourse, rather than bringing suit against a defaulting borrower. financers might
simply recover from the dealer's reserve account. In the usual case in which notes were
purchased without recourse, reserves were available for recovery in the few situations in
which qualified indorsement allows financing agencies rights against dealers. See note 82
supra.
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sale price.91 Some institutions seem to have given this payment to all
dealers; others only to certain favored dealers. Although the responses
do not indicate the exact degree of change in this practice, it is a fair
conclusion that the incentive payments have been considerably re-
stricted-some institutions have discontinued the practice altogether
and others have reduced the percentage or the number of dealers
participating.
Finally, many institutions since the Act have come to prefer direct
to indirect loans.92 One bank has found that by shifting its resources to
advertising to consumers rather than soliciting dealers it has increased
its direct loan business and had fewer defaults on home improvement
loans. The reasons for preferring direct loans are clear: the bank can
personally interview and directly evaluate a credit applicant-it need
not worry about error caused by the dealer's eagerness to make a sale-
and the bank has an opportunity to attract the customer's whole range
of banking business. Most important, since the elimination of negoti-
ability does not change the bank's legal position on direct loans, the
borrower's obligation to repay on a direct loan is not conditioned on
adequate performance by the dealer.
C. Impact of the Connecticut Act: Dealers
Home solicitation dealers recognize that fraud and sharp selling
practices have given them a public image which hurts their business
and makes them likely subjects for regulation. Every dealer responding
to this study reported that fraudulent salesmen had operated in Con-
necticut prior to the Act. 93 A majority were also of the opinion that
anyone, reputable or not, could secure financing under the old proce-
dures.94 The dealers varied greatly, however, in their reactions to the
effects of the Act. The responding dealers split on the proposition that
banks should be forced to take greater responsibility for home solicita-
tion sales, 95 and there was a similar disagreement on whether the
91. Normally a financer puts the market rate of interest on his notes. He may pay
dealers part of the interest in addition to the cash price to maintain and attract business.
92. Direct loans are normally made without the dealer's involvement, but the practice
of institutions making such loans on dealer recommendations is not unknown. One of
seven financing agencies--four banks and three sales finance companies-reported making
direct loans on the seller's recommendation. See p. 645 infra.
93. The responses to the question: "Do you think that dealers before July 1967 used
practices which were unfair to customers?" were as follows: most dealers, 3; many
dealers, 7; some dealers, 27; very few dealers, 12; no dealers at all, 0 (total responses, 49).
94. Thirty-three of 48 respondents so indicated.
95. Thirty-two of 48 respondents so indicated. Those who favored the increased respon.
sibility of financial institutions indicated that the Act would "weed out the crooks," "help
honest businessmen," and provide "more protection for the consumer." Those opposed
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fraudulent practices which existed before July 1967 have been changed
since then. 6
Behind these differing opinions about the worth of the Act lie the
practical effects of the financing agencies' new practices. It appears
that while several dealers have been considerably damaged, others have
been unaffected. Almost half of the dealers reported that it had become
more difficult to obtain financing since the passage of the Act.,-
Twenty dealers9s indicated that financial institutions with whom they
dealt had adopted new financing procedures since July 1967, and ten of
these dealers found the procedures so exacting and arduous that they
either could not or would not comply. More than one-third of the
thirty-two dealers9" who had received "incentive payments" prior to the
Act no longer receive them. Over half of the dealers who have found it
necessary to accept repurchase agreements have done so only since the
Act.100 Nine dealers must now discount their notes' 01-only five did so
before the Act. The number of dealers who reported that over 50 per
cent of their credit sales were financed by indirect loans fell from 28 to
19.102 Finally, a number of dealers were not even offered new procedures
as the price of continued credit: 15 of 46 responding dealers reported
to the Act's emphasis on the involvement of financial institutions stated their belief that
"banks are lending institutions, not policemen," "banks sell money, not roofing and sid-
ing," "it has made financing for legitimate businessmen harder to obtain," and "let the
buyer beware." A middle position was presented by one dealer who said he favored in-
creased bank responsibility if well done, but not as required by the Act: "There must
be a better way, as this can manifest itself to a greater control over all industry. Even-
tually to telling the individual how, what, when, and wherefor bringing about the total
loss of decision making. We will grant that something should be done but discriminatory
legislation is not the answer."
96. Twenty-three of 45 felt that there has been a change since July 1967. Several
reasons for the change were reported: the Act "has put dishonest dealers out of business,"
since "the fly-by-nighters cannot get financing"; dealers "are afraid to conduct an)thing
but an honest business"; and "more interest is shown by home owners in financial matters
caused by publicity of Act." Other dealers reported, however, that "the few unfair deal-
ers will still operate," some financial institutions will still "handle anyone," and the
fraudulent dealers "have new methods developed by now. You cannot beat them."
97. Twenty-two of 50 reported that it is more difficult for them to obtain financing
now than it had been prior to the Act. Most of the difficulty is undoubtedly related to
the substantive changes in financing practices. But many dealers also complained of the
heavy burden of increased paperwork imposed by the financers' new screening practices
and financing requirements.
98. Thirty-seven dealers responded to this question.
99. Thirteen dealers reported losing "incentive payinents."
100. Seventeen of 44 responding dealers reported agreeing to repurchase agreements
-ten of these had not done this prior to the Act. No financial institutions reported em-
ploying repurchase agreements prior to the Act. See p. 640 supra.
101. Forty-eight dealers responded to this question. Note that no banks reported dis-
counting. See pp. 640-41 supra.
102. It is impossible to separate those dealers who did not answer the question from
those who finance none of their sales by indirect loans, so a total number of respondents
cannot be given.
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that at least one financial institution which had previously purchased
their consumer paper refused to do so after the Act went into effect.
Several dealers seem to have found it virtually impossible since the
Act to obtain any financing at all and have been forced out of business.
Estimates of the number of such persons range as high as 50 or 60.103
Eleven dealers stated that they personally knew of men who had had
to give up their businesses since October 1967.104 Most of these persons
could not be located; those who were reached were still operating, but
their businesses had been severely damaged by the inability to sell con-
sumer paper.
Faced with this difficulty in obtaining financing for credit sales,
dealers had three options. First, they could stop operating door-to-door
and work instead out of a business office. This decision would place
them outside the scope of the Act and allow financing with negotiable
notes just as before. There is almost no indication, however, that the
dealers changed their business methods in this way-only four dealers
reported any shift of sales away from the home. 10° Thus, if the Act was
designed to discourage home solicitation sales, it did so only by driving
sellers out of business altogether.
Second, dealers could continue to sell on credit, but rather than
selling the consumer's note to a financer they could carry it themselves.
To secure liquid resources dealers would then normally have to take
out their own loans. To minimize the amount they would have
to borrow, dealers could shorten the five-year payment terms normally
offered consumers; where possible, dealers might even limit consumers
to 30-60-90-day credit arrangements 1 It is clear from the interviews
conducted during this study that some dealers who are unable to find
financers to purchase their paper or who are unwilling to accept the
new conditions imposed by financers have preferred the alternative of
financing consumer sales themselves.
Third, dealers could simply try to decrease their percentage of credit
sales. This has been the predominant form of accommodation to the
Act. Of 48 dealers reporting on the change in credit use, 23 had de-
103. Interviews with Connecticut dealers, spring 1968.
104. Thirty-five respondents knew of no such persons. On the questionnaires we were
told of over 30 dealers who had gone out of business and we were given the names of 15
of these.
105. In contrast, 43 reported that they had not "shifted sales away from the bome
in any way." Dealers may have felt that financers knew them as door-to-door sellers, and
since they could not easily determine how any particular sale was made, financers would
conservatively continue to regard these dealers as within the scope of the Act.
106. With such short-term financing, dealers might offer "open" credit terms whereby
the customer does not pay interest on the outstanding debt.
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creased their percentage of sales on credit, and only one had increased
the percentage of such sales. 07 Dealers could satisfy the consumer's
need for credit and still increase cash sales by encouraging buyers to
obtain direct loans from financial institutions. This approach, however,
requires consumer initiative and satisfactory credit standing,1 08 and
few dealers reported an increase in the number of sales financed by
direct loans.
A dealer can expedite the direct financing process by establishing
relations with particular lenders to whom he can refer his customers.
This financing method would preserve most of the convenience of in-
direct loans and might not be covered by the Act. 09 Several major
financial institutions have accepted the practice of making direct loans
on dealers' recommendations and it seems likely to become a wide-
spread method of financing home improvement sales.
Since the decrease in credit sales seems not to have been fully offset by
an increase in direct loan financing, one would expect to find that dealers
have suffered a decrease in sales volume. Such a decrease, however, does
not seem to have occurred." 0 Twenty-two dealers reported an increase in
107. Of the 23 decreases, 9 were of a magnitude of 25 per cent of total sales or more.
The following table displays the incidence of the decreases. The totals In the right-hand
column indicate the number of dealers in each credit category prior to the Act. The
numbers in the diagonal line marked with asterisks stayed within the same category sub.
sequent to the Act; the numbers to the left of the diagonal show the decreases. Thus, of
14 dealers employing indirect loans in from 50 to 100 'er cent of their total sales prior
to the Act, eight remained in that group after the Act, five dropped to the 25-50 per cent
class and one discontinued indirect loan financing altogether. Note that small changes.
such as the one reported increase which was from 35 to 40 per cent, are not reflected as
a shift from one general category in the table to another.
COMpAsSON OF PERCENTAGES oF DEALERs' SAT s FNANcED By INomEcr LOANs BroRE &%,D
A-m = Acr (By NummEs or DEALxms)
Loan Percentages Loan Percentages Subsequent to the ActPrior to the Act 0% 1-5% 6-25% 26-50% 51-100% Total
1-5% 1 39 0 0 0 46-25% 2 3 80 0 0 1326-50% 0 3 6 80 0 17
51-100% 1 0 0 5 80 14
Total 4 9 14 13 8 48
108. See pp. 654-55 infra.
109. It is unclear whether the Act covers direct loans on dealer recommendations. See
note S5 supra. If it is resolved that it does not, then such financing could easily be ued
to impair the consumer benefits of the Act.
110. Our figures on dollar volume are less complete and less e-act than those on
credit decrease. Sixteen dealers did not respond at all to any of the questions on dollar
volume and sales volume. See Appendix, Dealer Questionnaire, questions 28 & 29. From
the answers which were completed it was difficult to find appropriate blocs of time before
and after the Act to compare since most dealers' accounting is done on the calendar-year
basis.
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business volume since July 1967. Only four dealers reported a decrease,
and the volumes of nine others remained about the same.
These figures on sales volume, imprecise and uncertain as they are,
need to be squared with the very clear findings of a squeeze in indirect
financing and consequent decrease in credit extension by a significant
number of dealers. There may be several explanations for the surpris-
ing business volume figures. Business pride may have led some of those
suffering losses not to answer this question and others to respond
only with their best figures."1 Furthermore, dealers forced out of busi-
ness by the Act did not respond to the questionnaire at all. Then, too,
1968 seems to have been a generally good year for home improvement
sales." 2 Most of the explanation, however, probably lies in the dealers'
reactions to the Act. By requiring their customers to pay cash, whether
from savings or with the proceeds of a direct loan, the dealers could
avoid the new bank procedures. Thus, some dealers indicated that they
had shifted their sales to higher-income customers who would not be as
likely to require credit."3 Moreover, the dealers may have worked
harder soliciting sales in order to find cash buyers. Finally, the dealers
may have charged higher prices on fewer contracts, thereby avoiding a
loss in gross profits." 4
These considerations suggest that the reports of constant or slight
increases in sales volume" 5 may belie lost net income for the responding
dealers. While the dealers may have been able partially to raise prices
or increase their work effort-resulting in a constant or increased total
volume of sales-they probably have not been fully able to recoup their
costs. These dealers are also damaged competitively to the extent that
they have failed to expand their sales level to keep pace with an ex-
panding and inflationary market.
111. There was great discretion in selection of figures since questions of number of
sales and dollar volume on sales were divided into a total of thirteen different time periods
and the interpretative judgment of increase was based on whatever the dealer reported In
any of these time periods.
112. The total amount of all repair and modernization loans increased in 1968 by
about $200 million dollars. No other year in the 1960's experienced so large an increase,
and in 1967 there was a decrease. 55 FED. Ras. BULL. A-52 (1969).
113. Twenty-one of 46 dealers reported that since October 1967, they "sell to different
types of customers (for example, persons who are smaller credit risks)." Unfortunately,
these figures are unreliable as many dealers, judging by their comments, seem to have
misunderstood the question. See Appendix, Dealer Questionnaire, question 6(e).
114. Thirty-one of 't6 dealers reported that they had increased the prices charged cus.
tomers since October 1967. There are, however, so many factors such as increased cost
of materials, workmen, and living as well as larger consumer demand or disposable In-
come involved in a decision to increase prices that it is impossible to separate out the
number and portion of these increases directly attributable to the Act.
115. Thirteen dealers reported either no change in volume or only a slight increase,
and another four suffered decreases.
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On the basis of interviews and responses to financing agency question-
naires, a tentative description of the class of dealers which has been
damaged by the effects of the Act was developed. The damaged dealers
are small, do "general repair" work,116 sell largely by the straight door-
to-door method or perhaps the "phone-home" method,"-, make a high
percentage of credit sales, and sell a high percentage of their paper to
financing agencies. Several considerations support the accuracy of this
description. Small dealers operate largely door-to-door. This method
involves very little capital investment-it does not require the resources
that are necessary to open and staff an office or to advertise one's busi-
ness. Only slightly more capital is required to secure lists and solicit
from them by phone. Likewise, smaller businesses engage largely in
"general repair" work; larger contracts such as swimming pools and air
conditioning require greater resources and more workmen than they
can invest in a single job. Furthermore, such dealers work largely in
lower-income areas where the customers are thought to be less likely to
take the initiative and find a dealer on their own, more vulnerable to
the sales pitch,118 and more in need of modest repair services. Such
customers generally can make purchases only on credit, and to extend
credit smaller dealers need to convert the consumer paper into present
cash in order to purchase the supplies necessary to do the job."1 ,
Dealers sharing these characteristics are likely to be hardest hit by
the practices adopted by the financial institutions in response to the
Act. Straight door-to-door sellers are clearly within the scope of the Act's
restrictions. °20 As smaller firms, they do not bring in a significant
amount of credit business for financing agencies, nor do they offer much
other profit-making business to financers. 12 The low-income customers
of these dealers offer the highest credit risk. Finally, small businesses
are least likely to have sufficient resources to cover a repurchase obliga-
tion in the case of a high number of customer defaults.12
The questionnaire responses from dealers provide support for the
above description, which was suggested by interviews and the financing
agency questionnaires. In the first place, the results clearly support the
conclusion that small firms tend to do straight door-to-door solicitation
116. See p. 623 supra.
117. See note 29 supra.
118. See D. CAPLOVmTz, THE POOR PAY MORE xxi, 63-80 (1963).
119. See p. 625 supra.
120. Financing agency officials report that because they are uncertain of the scope of
the Act, they refuse to take negotiable paper on any contracts in any way solicited or
signed in the home. See note 30 supra.
121. See pp. 639-40 supra.
122. See p. 640 supra.
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and general repair work, while large firms are more likely to operate
out of an office and perform major additions and alterations. 1 23
123. The following table comparing size of business with type of work shows that
(1) four-fifths of the one-man firms do general repair work, while only about half of
the large firms do such work, and (2) large firms are more likely than small firms to
engage in the more substantial work of major alterations or additions.
COMPARISON OF BUSINESS SIZE wIT TYPE OF WORK
(By NUMBER OF DEALERS)
Size of Business
Type of One or Two- Larger
Work Man Firms Firms Total
General Repairs 12 13 25
Major Alterations
or Additions 3 12 15
Total 15 25 40
With respect to sales techniques, there is a contrast between the groups that engage
in the two methods which might be regarded as being at opposite ends of the spectrum
of dealer sophistication: those, on the one hand, who operate at least partially by the
straight door-to-door method and those, on the other, who do part of their work entirely
out of an office. Thus, 71 per cent of the large firms do no straight door-to-door solici.
tation while only 45 per cent of the small firms fall into this category.
COMPARISON OF BusiNEss SIZE WITH SMAIGHT DOOR-TO-DOOR SALES METHOD
(By NuMBER OF DEAuRS)
Percentage of Sales Done by
Straight Door-to-Door Method
Size of Business 0 25% 50% 75% 100% Total
One or Two-
man Firms 9 4 1 3 3 20
Larger Firms 22 4 1 2 2 81
Total 31 8 2 5 5 51
Furthermore, almost 88 per cent of the dealers who do some of their contracting entirely
in an office are large firms while less than 50 per cent of the firms who do no such work
are large.
COMPARISON OF BUSINESS SIZE wrr "BUSINESS-CONTRACr" SALES METIIOD
(BY NUMBER OF DEALERS)
Percentage of Sales Done by
"Business-Contract" Method
Size of Business 0 25% 50% 75% 100% Total
One or Two-
man Firms 18 2 0 0 0 20
Larger Firms 17 8 4 1 1 81
Total 35 10 4 1 1 51
In addition, none of the firms which do all of their work on a straight door-to-door basis
are engaged in major alterations or repairs.
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Second, the results indicate that, in institutional financing and
credit sales, small dealers who concentrate on door-to-door selling have
been competitively disadvantaged relative to large firms by the effects
of the Act. Before the Act was passed, credit sales and bank financing
were not concentrated in any portion of the home improvement busi-
ness.'- There was no correlation between size of firm and percentage
of credit sales a dealer made, between method of doing business and
percentage of credit sales, between size and degree of reliance on
indirect loans, or between method of doing business and reliance
on indirect loans. By the time of this study, however, significant
correlations could be found. Prior to the Act, seven of 15 one-man firms
COMPA IUSON OF TYPE OF WoRu wrr STRAcHT DOOR-To-DooR SALES ME"rOD
(BY NumER OF DEALERs)
Percentage of Sales Done by
Straight Door-to-Door Method
Type of Work 0 25% 50% 75% 100% Total
General Repairs 14 4 1 3 3 25
Major Alterations
or Additions 10 2 1 2 0 15
Total 24 6 2 5 3 40
It is interesting to note that the newer firms, contrary to what one might expect, are
not among the smaller repair businesses. All five firms in our study which have been in
business less than five years are in the big firm category-three of these are also engaged
in "major home improvements." It is the oldest firms which tend to be small and engaged
in general repair work.
COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF YEARS IN BUSINESs WITH TYPE OF WORK
(BY NubmER OF DEALRm)
Years in Business
Type of Work 1-5 6-15 Over 15 Total
General Repairs 1 8 15 24
Major Alterations
or Additions 3 6 6 15
Total 4 14 21 39
COMPARISON OF NUMBER OF YEARS IN BusINEsS wiT BusINEss SIZE
(By Nuimizi OF DEALEIS)
Years in Business
Size of Business 1-5 6-15 Over 15 Total
One or Two-
man Firms 0 8 11 19
Larger Firms 5 11 15 31
Total 5 19 26 50
Thus, it seems that in recent years a number of large businesses have entered the market
to challenge older one- or two-man firms.
124. See note 32 supra.
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used indirect financing in at least three-quarters of their credit sales;
only three did so after the Act, a 57 per cent decrease. By contrast, 15 of
31 large dealers used indirect financing for three-quarters or more of
their sales, and this figure dropped by only 20 per cent (to 12). Similarly,
60 per cent of the one-man firms, as opposed to fewer than 40 per cent
of the large firms, were forced to restrict the number of their credit
sales.125
The same pattern of discrimination is found in the relationship be-
tween methods of doing business and number of credit sales. Among
the 20 dealers engaged in some straight door-to-door sales, 11 (55 per
cent) suffered a decrease in credit sales, while only 12 of 31 (39 per
cent) of those not engaged in such sales suffered a decrease. Seen from
the other extreme, three (19 per cent) of 16 firms which complete some
of their sales in a business office suffered a decrease in credit sales while
20 (57 per cent) of the 35 others were forced to restrict credit sales.
D. Impact of the Connecticut Act: Consumers
The Connecticut Act must finally be evaluated against the standard
it sets as its ultimate purpose: protection and advancement of con-
sumer interests. The critical question in this evaluation is to determine
the working balance between the benefits of increased concern for
work quality and availability of defenses on the one hand and the in-
creased cost to the consumer on the other.
120
1. Availability of Defenses
The elimination of negotiability extends directly to consumers one
clear legal benefit which does not depend in any way on private business
125. Nine of 15 responding one- or two-man firms extended credit in fewer sales sub-
sequent to the Act; 12 of 31 larger firms did so.
126. The previous sections have described the adjustments we found to have occurred
in the Connecticut business community since the Act. Financers and dealers are discrete,
identifiable groups affected directly in their day-to-day work by the Act; as such, It was
practicable to conduct an empirical investigation of the Act's impact on them. Our re-
sources, however, did not permit us to survey empirically the group of consumers affected
by the Act, since this group, which includes everyone receiving door-to-door solicitations,
is too large and ill-defined. Moreover, the Act's effects on the individual consumer in
this group is usually so slight and the consumer so unaware that the accuracy of the
results of such a survey would be open to serious challenge. Our findings then go only to
the forms that the business community has devised to pursue its self-interest in the new
legal context. Yet, these findings are relevant to the question of effects on the consumer
in two significant respects. First, much of the Act's interest for consumers lies in its
impact on fraudulent dealers and these can be most directly determined by an examina-
tion of financing agencies and dealers. Second, information about financing and selling
practices cuts down the number of unknowns in the consumer protection formula, tirs
providing an underpinning of real-world knowledge on which to base more theoretical
conclusions about the Act's ultimate effects on consumers.
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ordering: the consumer may now defend in a suit brought by a financing
agency for non-payment of his note by introducing proof of the dealer's
unsatisfactory performance under the contract. This procedural en-
largement of the buyer's remedies decreases the costs to individual
consumers in two ways. First, when the dealer is solvent and subject to
suit, the buyer can now avoid the expense of either joining the dealer
in defense of a suit brought by the financer or bringing a separate
action against the dealer. Second, where the dealer is insolvent or un-
available, the buyer can shift onto the financer the loss which he pre-
viously bore alone.
This change in the financers' liability creates in turn an increased
concern for adequate performance by the dealers whose paper they
purchase, and, at the same time, it makes indirect loans riskier and thus
more costly.
2. Screening of Dealers
While the Act's elimination of negotiability does not directly ob-
ligate financial institutions to screen out fraudulent dealers, the theory
underlying the consumer protection model is that such screening will
be induced and benefit consumers. This theory, however, is based on
certain assumptions which may not be valid. In the first place, the
screening may not touch dealers who use "sharp" but not illegal prac-
tices-those dealers, for example, who employ high-pressure sales tactics
and who sell at higher prices than are merited by their cheap products
and hasty work. The elimination of negotiability does not induce the
financing agency to cut off these dealers, because their work, while
grossly inferior, does not provide the consumer with any valid grounds
for non-payment.127
Secondly, the consumer protection model assumes that the financial
institutions will profit only if there are few defaults. But financing those
dealers who occasionally engage in illegal practices can be profitable
if the dealers are willing to pay a charge appropriate to the risk they
represent to the financer 2 In home solicitation sales, at least, there is
reason to believe that the fraudulent dealer will be able and willing to
pay the higher financing charges. Since the door-to-door buyer nor-
127. If, moreover, financers charge the same rates for financing to all, dealers would
find "sharp" tactics to be the most profitable mode of operation if these tactics provide
the largest net return on each sale.
128. This economic model is limited to the extent that financial institutions will re.
fuse to finance a profitable but fraudulent dealer out of fear of acquiring a bad name
and thereby losing other business.
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mally does not go into the market place to compare different sellers,
products, and prices, such a dealer might expect to profit by making
more sales, charging higher prices, and providing lower quality goods
than do honest dealers. 129 Moreover, the rate which the financial insti-
tution needs to charge the dealer to cover its costs might not fully re-
flect the extent of the dealer's fraudulent activities. The typically pas-
sive consumer will often pay without complaint even though he has
an actionable claim. Or, if the consumer initially resists payment, he
will often cave in when the financial agency applies informal or legal
pressure.
Since there was no way to determine definitely which dealers were
fraudulent, the findings of this study do not directly indicate whether
such dealers have been injured or put out of business by the elimina-
tion of negotiability. 130 But the general business practices that have
developed under the Act suggest the probable impact upon fraudulent
dealers.
Most financial institutions do seem to have instituted new screening
methods.' Some of these procedures-such as checking individual jobs
and consulting the Better Business Bureau-are related to the quality
of the dealer's work and to this extent it appears that financers share
the consumer's concern with the dealer's standard of performance.
The pressure the Act imposes on financers to screen out inferior
dealers is, however, partially undermined by the use of repurchase
agreements. 132 The repurchase agreement restores much of the insula-
tion from buyers' defenses that financing agencies enjoyed as holders in
due course. Though there are practical limitations which prevent the
reliable use of agreements with dealers who might easily leave the
jurisdiction or with very questionable operators, in ordinary cases
the agreements enable the bank or finance company to be nearly as
unconcerned about the quality of the work financed as it was before the
Act.
Moreover, when financial institutions do not employ repurchase
agreements or to the extent that they must look for assurances beyond
the agreements, it appears that they are not concerned with the dealer's
performance alone; the amount of work a dealer does with the financer
and the size of the dealer's business appear to be very important con-
129. See Sher, supra note 4, at 726.
130. For a description of dealers injured by the Act, see p. 648 supra.
131. See p. 638 supra.
132. Of course repurchase agreements in no way negate the effects of the Act In pro-
viding for the availability of defenses. See generally p. 640 supra.
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siderations in deciding whether to finance him. Decisions based on these
overlapping factors do assist the consumer to the extent that they cut
out the fly-by-night operator, but at the same time they damage the
much larger group of legitimate small businessmen. Screening done in
this manner-on grounds largely irrelevant to buyers-will reduce the
number of dealers in the home improvement business. This decrease
will deprive some consumers of services altogether and injure others
to the slight extent that competition imposes price and quality con-
straints on door-to-door sellers.
3. Increased Costs to Consumers
With negotiable notes, certain consumers who receive inadequate
performance are forced to bear the costs of insuring the free movement
of consumer paper; their interests are, in effect, sacrificed to the econ-
omy's alleged need for negotiability. The elimination of negotiability
lifts this burden from these individual buyers, but the costs of unsatis-
factory performance by the sellers, plus the additional costs created by
the change in the law,133 must be borne by someone.
Exposing financers to consumer defenses makes business riskier and
thus costlier for them. Previous sections of this study described how
financial institutions-through the use of repurchase agreements, dis-
counting, and the elimination of incentive payments, for example-
have largely shifted these new costs to dealers.134 It seems likely that
dealers have in turn passed most of these increased costs back to con-
sumers.
Dealers can shift costs to consumers by raising their prices, lowering
the quality of their products and services, and employing pressure
sales tactics.'35 The consumer, in theory, would react to these devices by
133. The possibility that financial institutions have overreacted to the Act and have
thereby created additional costs is discussed at p. 655 infra.
134. By raising interest rates, financial institutions can shift some of the costs directly
to consumers. This is an expected result of the Act, but our data on this practice is
incomplete. See pp. 64041 supra.
135. Such changes would be the expected reaction to each of the dealer's new burdens.
Repurchase agreements might arguably increase the seller's sense of responsibility to the
buyer. However, this seems true only to the extent that the financer is a more effective
complainant than the consumer who has always had the right to sue for inadequate
performance. The new element introduced by the repurchase agreement is that the
dealer will effectively lose his financing in any case in which a consumer for any reason.
valid or not, refuses payment. This represents a significant rise in costs for the dealer
which he would have to pass on if he were to maintain his profit level. The elimination
of incentive payments might be said to benefit the consumer in that he is thus given a
more accurate picture of the costs of credit, but this seems an academic advantage for the
uncritical door-to-door buyer, and once again it represents an increased cost to the
dealer which is likely to be passed on to consumers. Discounting is the clearest case of
increased charges to the buyer. If the interest rate represents the market cost of credit,
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buying fewer goods or by purchasing instead from retailers not forced
to make such changes. It seems, however, that in practice the passivity
of the door-to-door buyer does allow many dealers to shift most of the
costs onto the consumer: 13 the discipline of competition is ineffective
where customers do not go into the market to compare prices and
quality.
Even though many of the costs of inadequate dealer performance and
the change in the status quo may be shifted back onto consumers, the
Act causes a more even-handed distribution of these costs. Rather than
falling totally on the chance victim of poor performance, the costs are
spread among all home improvement consumers.
37
4. Direct Loans
A consequence of the increased financing costs for indirect loans and
the financer's refusal to handle some of these loans at all has been a
general switch to direct loans. Although consumers are obligated to
repay direct loans regardless of the quality of the dealer's performance,
the trend to direct loans appears to work against sharp dealing and
fraud1 38 Unlike a sale with attached financing papers, the buyer's iner-
tia with a direct loan is on the side of not making the purchase. The
buyer is not likely to sign a cash contract until he has gone to a financial
institution and secured a loan. This gives the buyer an automatic "cool-
ing-off" period after the sales pitch, and it may induce him to consider
alternative purchases. Securing a direct loan may also force him to
consider the credit terms more carefully than in the case of an indirect
loan, where the interest rate is difficult to distinguish from the product
price. Finally, direct loans cut out the middleman and such unseen
costs as discounting and incentive payments.
The shift to direct loans, however, may have an adverse effect on
low-income consumers. Such persons are frequently hesitant to enter
into dealings with bankers. Also, before the Act, as part of a larger on-
going business arrangement with dealers, financers were willing to pur-
it may be assumed that the amount of the discount is the margin of extra cost which
must be paid for financing through door-to-door dealers rather than through ordinary
retailers.
136. This shifting is limited, however, since at some point even the passive consumer
will become sensitive to higher charges and lower quality.
137. For a partial application of loss distribution theories to negotiable instruments,
see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YAtE L.J.
499, 549 (1961).
138. To the extent that direct loans are made on dealer recommendations, they nore
closely resemble indirect loans and take away some inconvenience which might cause the
consumer to evaluate a purchase critically. See p. 645 supra.
654
Vol. 78: 618, 1969
Impact of Consumer Legislation
chase the notes of customers to whom individually they would either
charge very high rates or refuse credit altogether.130 Since low-income
buyers are dependent on credit merchandising to secure their small
share of consumer goods, such buyers might be seriously hurt by the
general switch to direct loans.
E. Conclusion
The debate over proposals to eliminate or restrict negotiable notes in
consumer transactions has revolved primarily around alleged consumer
benefits on the one hand and corresponding detriment to financial in-
stitutions on the other.140 This study shows that this characterization of
the issues is misleading. First, while the elimination of negotiability
per se places major additional costs on financers, these institutions are
able to pass most of them on. Segond, dealers, rarely considered in pre-
vious discussions, bear many of the additional costs, and some are
seriously injured by difficulty in obtaining financing. Third, although
consumers directly benefit from the Act, they must ultimately bear
much of the cost of the change.1
4 1
An evaluation of the elimination of negotiability in consumer sales
must take into account its effect on overall economic costs to society.
The primary costs of operating with negotiable notes stem from dealer
fraud.142 Elminating negotiability makes fraudulent dealers bad credit
risks, and thus induces financial institutions to be reluctant to take
their notes. The findings of this study suggest that financers impose
important new restrictions on dealers which should reduce the extent
of fraud in sales. On the other hand, the conservative reaction by most
banks and finance companies to the elimination of negotiability in Con-
necticut has created another cost-widespread difficulty in marketing
consumer paper. This apparent overreaction has resulted in higher
charges to consumers and damage to legitimate businessmen. Whether
these costs more than offset the benefits from restrictions designed to
penalize fraudulent dealers is impossible to calculate exactly.
It may be predicted, however, that as experience with the use of
139. See C. PHELps, FuANcmrW THE INSTAL MIT PURCHASES OF THE AMEMJ, FAMLY
60-69 (1954).
140. Compare Gilmore, supra note 5, at 1101, with Kripke, supra note 3, at 470.
141. This issue of increased costs to consumers is mentioned but not discussed in
Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty under the Uniform Commercial Code,
59 Y=x. L.J. 1209, 1222 (1950).
142. Fraud creates three types of costs. An injured party suffers an absolute loss
when he is unable to recover from the fraudulent party; even when he is able to recover
he incurs legal or other incidental costs in doing so; and any person attempting to avoid
being defrauded incurs the costs of taking protective measures.
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nonnegotiable notes accumulates, there will be a trend in financing
practices toward a more rational calculation of risks. This trend can
be encouraged by a wider awareness within the financial community of
the effects of the Connecticut Act, pressure exerted by the combined
forces of consumer groups and small businessmen, greater competition
among financers,' 4 3 and increased availability of FHA financing of
home improvement loans.144 As the effects of financer overreaction
are mitigated, the reduction of fraud should weigh heavily in favor of
the elimination of negotiability in consumer sales.
Even apart from these calculations, however, elimination of negoti-
ability should be supported because of the distribution of costs it effects.
Whereas with negotiable notes the buyer who chanced to contract with
an unscrupulous salesman carried the whole burden of the risk of fraud,
without such notes this burden is placed on financers who have the
economic power to spread the costs over the whole business. The
slightly increased costs thus imposed on dealers and consumers who
would not otherwise be forced to share them are necessary incidents of
regulating the imperfections and injustices of the market.
APPENDIX
DEALER QUESTIONNAIRE
ALL ANSWERS WILL BE KEPT IN STRICT CONFIDENCE
Note: This study is not concerned with the consequences of the new
Truth-in-Lending Bill. It focuses only on Connecticut P. A. 749, the
Home Solicitation Sales Act. Please answer, in so far as possible, only
with reference to the Home Solicitation Sales Act.
1. What is your main line of business? (For example, roofing, roofing
and siding, swimming pools, etc.)
2. In what manner are your sales made? (Check approximate percent-
age of sales for each category.) (Percentage of number of sales)
100% 75% 50% 25% 0
a. You or your employee(s) go
door-to-door, find people who are
interested in making purchases,
143. See note 80 supra.
144. See note 34 supra.
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and sign the contract at their
homes.
b. You or your employee(s) re-
ceive calls or visits from people
interested in making purchases
and you then visit them in their
homes and sign the contracts
there.
c. You receive calls and visit
homes, but sign the contracts at
your place of business.
d. People come to your place
of business and the sale is con-
cluded there without any visit to
the customer's home.
3. Have the above percentages changed significantly since last October
(the date the new Home Solicitation Sales Act went into effect)?
Yes , No - If so, please indicate the pattern of sales prior to
October 1967 marking the percentages as in question No. 2.
100% 75% 50% 25% 0
a. You or your employee(s) go
door-to-door, find people who are
interested in making purchases,
and sign the contract at their
homes.
b. You or your employee(s) re-
ceive calls or visits from people
interested in making purchases
and you visit them in their homes
and sign the contracts there.
c. You receive calls and visit
homes, but sign the contracts at
your place of business.
d. People come to your place
of business and the sale is con-
cluded there without any visit
to the customer's home.
4. How many persons are involved in your business?
a. Primarily a one-man business? -
b. One head of business and one full-time canvasser?
c. Other (please specify, briefly)?
5. Has the number of persons in or structure of your business changed
since last October? Yes . , No - If so please describe briefly.
6. Have your sales or selling methods significantly changed since Octo-
ber 1967?
a. Do you sell different products? Yes -, No - If so, which?
b. Do you sell different grades of the same products? Yes
No - If so, what briefly is the difference?
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c. Have the prices you charge customers changed since last October?
Yes , No _ . If so, what is the approximate percentage change?
d. Have you shifted sales away from the home in any way? Yes __,
No _ . If so, please describe.
e. Do you sell to different types of customers? Yes -, No -.
(For example, persons who are smaller credit risks.) If so, please
describe.
f. Other changes? Please describe briefly.
7. How many years have you been in this business? - How many
years in this business in Connecticut?
8. Prior to the passage of the Home Solicitation Sales Act in July,
1967, did you use either banks or finance companies to help finance
your customers' purchases? If so, did you use:
a. Banks alone __
b. Finance companies alone __
c. Both banks and finance companies
d. How many financial institutions __
If you used neither, please briefly describe how the sales were
financed.
9. Prior to the Act what percentage of your total sales were financed
by credit? (Percentage of dollar amount.)
10. Since the Act what percentage of your total sales have been
financed by credit? (Percentage of dollar amount.)
11. Arrangements with Financial Institutions prior to July, 1967.
(Check to indicate what percentage of credit sales were made in each
of the following manners.) (Percentage of number of credit sales.)
100% 75% 50% 25% 0
a. Bank or finance company pur-
chase from you of the customer's
note which you had accepted. - -
b. Direct loan from bank to cus-
tomer on your recommendation. - - -
c. Direct loan from bank to cus-
tomer without your involvement. - -
d. Other (please specify). - -
(Space is left here if you want to more fully describe the way your
sales were financed. You are especially encouraged to comment if
none of the alternatives listed above satisfactorily describes your
financing system.)
12. Arrangements with Financial Institutions since October, 1967.
(Check to indicate what percentage of credit sales were made in each
of the following manners.)
100% 75% 50% 25% 0
a. Bank or finance company pur-
chase from you of the customer's
note which you had accepted.
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b. Direct loan from bank to cus-
tomer on your recommendation. - -
c. Direct loan from bank to cus-
tomer without your involvement. - -
d. Other. (If so, please describe.) - -
13. Since the Act have any of the banks or finance companies with
which you previously dealt refused: (This information, like all other
answers in this questionnaire, will be kept in strict confidence.)
a. To accept your paper? Yes -, No
b. To give direct loans to customers recommended by you? Yes.,
No _
c. Other refusals (please specify)?
14. If there were refusals:
a. Which banks and finance companies were these?
b. What were the alleged reasons for the refusal?
15. Is it more difficult to obtain financing now than in July 1967?
Yes -, No - If so please explain.
16. a. What interest rate do your customers pay to obtain their credit?
Give an average loan amount - and an average loan term
along with the interest rate
b. Has this interest rate gone up since August 1967? If so, on the
same average loan and term, what was the rate then? -
c. Do you now have to post bonds? Yes , No -, or accept
reserves, Yes . No -, in the bank(s) with which you deal?
If so, what are the terms?
d. Did you have to engage in either of these practices prior to the
Act? Yes ., No - If so what were the terms then?
e. Do you now receive "incentive payments" (a percentage of the
interest on the sale-sometimes referred to as "kickbacks") from the
banks or finance companies with which you deal? Yes .- , No
How much is this (express by percentage)?
f. Did you receive such "incentive payments" prior to the Act?
Yes _ , No.. If so what were the terms then?
g. Do any financial institutions with which you deal take more
than the interest rates-that is, require that you pay them part of
the sales price? Yes . No - If so, what were the terms then?
h. Did the financial institutions with which you deal do this
take part of the sales price - prior to the Act? Yes -, No
If so what were the terms then?
17. Have the banks or finance companies with whom you deal adopted
new screening procedures since July 1967? Yes -, No - If so,
please check the one of the following categories which best describes
your attitude toward the new practices.
a. They were no trouble for you and you accepted them.
b. They were a nuisance but you accepted them.
c. Because they were a nuisance, you didn't wish to and therefore
did not comply with them. - On refusing to comply you had to
stop doing business with that financial institution
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d. They were so tough that you could not comply with them.
This forced you to stop doing business with that institution.
18. Do you think that any or almost any dealer, reputable or not,
could obtain financing from a bank or finance company before the
Act? Yes -, No -.
Has that situation changed now? Yes -, No _. If so, please
briefly describe.
19. Do you know of any banks or finance companies which before the
Act would finance practically anyone? Yes - , No - . Which
banks or finance companies?
20. Do you know of anyone who has had to go out of business alto-
gether since October 1967, because of inability to obtain financing?
Yes -, No __. If so, how many? - What are their names and
where do they live?
21. Can you obtain notes from banks which don't have "Home Solici-
tation Sales" written on them? Yes - , No _ . If so, when do you
use the paper without "Home Solicitation Sales" marked on it?
22. a. In order to obtain financing, do you have to agree with the bank
to repurchase any commercial paper when a customer claims he
doesn't have to pay? Yes -, No -. Has this change since
October 1967? Yes - , No _ . If so, how?
b. Do you have to guarantee a certain number of payments from
your customers? Yes - , No _ . Has this changed since October
1967? Yes -, No -. If so, how?
23. Do you think it is a good policy to force banks to have greater
responsibility for home solicitation sales? Yes -, No _ . Please
explain briefly your answer.
24. Do you think that dealers before July 1967 used practices which
were unfair to customers? Yes -, No _. (Don't include in your
consideration the problem of informing customers about bank interest
rates.)
Most dealers - Many dealers - Some dealers - Very few
dealers - No dealers at all _
Would you estimate that these practices have changed since July
1967? Yes - , No _. If so, how?
25. Please list a few of the practices which you consider to be unfair.
26. Have any of your customers used the new "cooling-off period"
provided by the statute to cancel purchases within the next business
day after they were made? Yes - , No -.
a. If so, how many? - Did you collect the penalty? Yes
No __ . What were the alleged reasons for the cancellations?
b. Do you inform your customers at the time of making a sale of
their right to cancel within the "cooling-off period?" Yes
No _.
27. Prior to October 1967, did you as a matter of business practice,
allow customers to cancel sales already concluded?
a. As long as you hadn't already begun work on the job?-.-
b. Within a day?
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If so, did you charge a penalty? -
28. What was the approximate dollar volume of your business in:
1966 Oct.-Dec. 1967
Oct.-Dec. 1966 Jan.-Mar. 1968
Jan.-Mar. 1967 Apr.-June 1968
Apr.-June 1967 July 1967
July-Sept. 1967 July 1968
29. How many sales did you make in 1966? -
How many sales did you make in 1967? -
How many sales do you estimate you will make in 1968?
ALL ANSWERS WILL BE KEPT IN STRICT CONFIDENCE
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